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ABSTRACT 
The poverty eradication mission called Kudumbashree is a women-
centered anti-poverty program initiated in 1998 by the Government of 
Kerala, in India. Based on a primary survey of neighborhood groups in 
two communities, the study examines the dynamics of high repayment 
rates and the social impact of this micro-enterprise program. 
The study found that repayment rates are relatively lower in non-
agricultural activities because of the marketing problems (resulting from 
the creation of non-tradables), while it is relatively successful in the 
agricultural sector. High repayment rates are found to be propelled by 
dynamic incentives like subsidies and the prospect of loan renewal. 
Finally, the study found that borrowers did considerable double-dipping 
(borrowing from other microfinance programs) and borrowed from non-
institutional sources. This raises questions about their real indebtedness. 
Kudumbashree's real impact could be found in its social capital 
impact. It creates considerable social interactions among the poor and 
facilitates women's empowerment. Peer monitoring and peer mentoring 
interactions among the members of the group create positive externalities 
- a common knowledge pool and social safety nets. It is able to leverage 
these externalities with local governments, which enables women to exert 
influence in their communities' political power structures. 
Keywords: Microfinance; Group lending; Repayment rate. 
JEL Classification: 016; 017; G21. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The poor in developing countries like India face many constraints 
including the lack of access to institutional sources of finance (World 
Bank, 2001). In general, credit markets worldwide are characterized by 
asymmetric information, moral hazard problems and credit market failures 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993). Among the borrowers, 
the poor are normally considered not bankable because of their lack of 
collateral and/or prospective income and/or credit record, and are therefore 
severely credit rationed. The inability of the poor to obtain credit 
contributes to a variety of problems such as: low levels of consumption, 
malnutrition, low investment in human capital, inadequate medical care, 
high level of indebtedness etc., thereby increasing their vulnerability. 
At the theoretical level, the imperfect information framework 
provides explanations of why the poor are excluded from the credit 
markets. Recent theoretical studies on 'group-lending' look at how this 
problem can be avoided. Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990) and Becker (1991) 
highlight the importance of peer-monitoring in resolving problems of moral 
hazard and costly enforcement. Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Tassel (1999) 
argue that group lending could lead to homogenous group formation, while 
Besley and Coate (1995), and Rai and Sjostrom (2004) emphasize the 
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possibility of repeat lending of loan as the reason for prompt repayment of 
loans. 
Apart from these arguments, poverty activists have argued that 
lending to the poor can be profitable for both the lender and the borrower 
(Dowla and Barua, 2006). This argument is based on the premise that for 
very small amounts of capital, the poor are more likely to have much 
higher returns for the marginal unit of capital than a wealthy individual or 
business that has already realized these high initial returns and is now 
functioning in the diminishing-returns range of the production function. 
There were numerous attempts to address the market failure 
problem in the credit markets. One such solution practiced in many 
developing countries was the Rotating Savings and Credit Association 
(ROSCA). Under this informal scheme, a group of friends and 
acquaintances pool their resources to help each other in buying big-ticket 
items to meet consumption and small business needs. Under this scheme, 
each member contributes an equal amount at fixed intervals (such as a 
week or a month) for an agreed-upon period of time. One of the group's 
participants keeps each period's total contributions but each participant 
continues to contribute until the end of the scheduled period. If a member 
fails to meet his or her obligations, then the rest of the group will likely 
bear the loss and the defaulting member could be expelled from the group. 
ROSCA has the advantage of helping low-income participants but it is 
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organized on the premise of savers eventually becoming borrowers.1 
Moreover, this type of arrangement is relatively rigid because of its very 
limited flexibility in loan size and timing. 
The second initiative, which overcame the rigidity problem of 
ROSCAs, is the credit cooperative or credit union. This type of institution 
is widespread in developing countries (like India and Indonesia). The 
cooperative is run locally by its members and unlike ROSCAs, its methods 
of operation are flexible. However, the major weakness of the credit union 
is the limited availability of local resources which constrains its lending 
ability. 
The third initiative, started in many countries, especially in the 
1960s, is the setting up of subsidized banks for the poor called 
development banks by public policy authorities. Apart from this, other 
banks are directed by regulators to extend credit to the poor under directed 
credit programs. These are 'supply-driven' programs usually implemented 
on the basis of fixed targets for financial intermediaries. This system often 
accentuates the moral hazard problems in the credit market resulting in 
poor repayments and the emergence of large non-performing assets (NPAs) 
in the assets portfolios of the banks, consequently affecting the financial 
viability and sustainability of the formal financial system. 
Reforms in the financial sector worldwide have been in the 
McKinnon-Shaw tradition of removing administrative controls on savings 
1
 This is only one type of ROSCA. For other types of ROSCA encountered around the 
world, see The Poor and Their Money, by Rutherford (2000). 
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and loans. This model of reforms was embedded in the lending and reform 
programs of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their approach was top-down and 
confined only to the formal sector. The failure of these types of reforms to 
meet the credit demands of the poor encouraged the development of 
another financial tool - micro-credit - which aimed at providing financial 
capital access to the poor on a more sustainable basis. In the early 1980s, 
micro-credit and microfinance arose as alternatives to traditional 
development policies. 
The Grameen Bank, established in 1976 by Prof. Dr. Mohammed 
Yunus in Bangladesh, successfully lent out small amounts to poor 
borrowers for purchasing agricultural animals, tools, for leasing of shop 
premises, etc., and found that the default rate was extremely low. The 
success of Bangladesh's experiment of the Grameen Bank wherein banks 
lend to social groups (especially poor women), rather than individuals, 
with social collateral as a backing and with close peer monitoring, became 
a model of credit dispensation for the poor worldwide3. Among the 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the developing countries, prominent 
ones include BancoSol in Bolivia, the Bank Rakyat in Indonesia, the Self 
2
 The Grameen Bank organized the poor into three to eight persons lending groups, which 
in turn formed six-group lending societies. No collateral was required, but group members 
got loans only if all members made their payments. 
The Grameen Bank was established in 1983. 'Grameen' means "village" or "rural". It was 
established by Mr. Mohammed Yunus, a Ph.D. in economics from Vanderbilt University 
who returned to Bangladesh as an academic at University of Chittagong. Dr. Yunus in his 
autobiography said that he was inspired to start Grameen Bank by a chance meeting with a 
poor woman in 1974. She made bamboo stools for a living but had to borrow money at 
rates as high as 10 percent per week to purchase materials. He dipped into his own pocket 
and lent a group of 42 basket weavers, the equivalent of U.S.$ 27 (Yunus, 1999). 
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Employed Women's Association (SEW A) Bank in India, the 
Tequisquiapan Project in Mexico, etc. Microfinance programs are not 
charity programs, rather, as Dr. Mohammed Yunus puts it, they are 
"business lending with a social objective" (Yunus, 1999). Between 
December 1997 and December 2005, the number of people who received 
credit rose from 13.5 million to 113.3 million of which 84 percent were 
women (Daley-Harris, 2006). 
In 2006, Dr. Mohammed Yunus, along with the Grameen Bank, 
won the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in promoting financial services for 
the poor. The Grameen Bank and the Mohammed Yunus way of 
contributing to peace represents one of the most successful techniques of 
factoring human beings into a credit delivery system intended to serve the 
nations' poor. Group lending with joint liability for groups changed the 
repayment dynamics: the default and transaction costs were very small. It 
became a model of poverty reduction through the finance route. The 
Gramen Bank model sidestepped the entire development bureaucracy, 
altered the rural power structure and worked directly with the poor. Its 
work is based on a confidence that poor women know what is best for 
them; all they need is the efficient delivery of user-friendly credit so that 
they can get on and do it. By putting money in poor women's hands, it 
begins, at least, to redress their powerlessness. The Bangladesh Grameen 
Bank model was later on converted into a rural poverty eradication 
platform (under the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRDC)) 
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and became a model of microfinance throughout the world . The Grameen 
Bank now has 6.6 million borrowers and as of August 2006, lent U.S.$ 5.7 
billion; 97 percent of the borrowers are women and the average loan size is 
almost U.S.$ 130, with a 99 percent loan repayment rate. In 2005, the 
return to equity of Grameen Bank was an impressive 21 percent (Grameen 
Bank website, www.grameen-info.org). 
In the literature, a distinction is normally made between micro-
credit and microfinance. Micro-credit focuses on poverty reduction through 
loans and social change, while the term microfinance emphasizes the 
benefits of reviewing a wider variety of financial services (Armendariz de 
Aghion and Murdoch, 2005). 
In developed countries too, microfinance organizations have been 
set up: examples include Micro-Business International (Washington), the 
Good Faith Fund (Arkansas), Lakota Friend (South Dakota), Katalysis and 
Micro-Enterprise Capital Corporation (Washington), Cherokee Community 
Loan fund and Trickleup Program (New York), ADIE (Association pour le 
Droit a l'lnitiative Economique) Credit Project for Self-Employment 
(France), Micro Credit Rainbow (Italy), and the First People's fund, 
Calmedow Foundation5 (Canada). Recently, the Canadian government has 
4
 The classic Grameen Bank model hit a wall in 1998, when a devastating flood pushed 
up losses and people began missing their weekly meetings. However, Dr. Yunus 
restructured it in 2001 by emphasizing savings rather than credit. 
5
 Since 1994, the Royal Bank of Canada in collaboration with Calmeadow, has funded a 
microfinance program in Nova Scotia to help people who are unemployed or who had 
bad credit histories. The Calmeadow Nova Scotia project lends up to C$ 5,000 for 
business startups and existing enterprises, starting with a loan of C$ 1,500 and then rising 
with experience. The project initially employed the peer group lending model which was 
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pledged the Bangladesh Grameen Bank to the tune of C$ 1.6 million on 
microfinance, education and other developmental projects in Afghanistan 
(Canadian International Development Agency, 2007). 
The success of Bangladesh's Grameen Bank stirred interest in 
microfinance worldwide and gained momentum after the Micro-Credit 
Summit of February 1997 in Washington. The World Bank, largely 
ignorant of micro-credit and micro-savings even well into the early 1990s, 
started paying attention to this movement as an instrument to fight against 
poverty and in June 1995, established the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP). According to the Micro-Credit Summit Campaign, an 
estimated 100 million micro-loans of an average amount of U.S.$ 250 were 
given in 2005 as compared with U.S.$ 13.5 million in 1997 (Daley-Harris, 
2006). 
Globally, the success of the Grameen Bank has attracted large 
banks and venture capitalists into microfinance. They see this area as one 
of low risk investments as well as an avenue to display their philanthropy. 
Today, other financial institutions including multinational banks like 
Citigroup, Standard Chartered, ABN Amro, etc., finance micro-loans under 
the group lending approach. Citigroup, ABN Amro and HSBC Bank all 
have microfinance portfolios. India's largest bank, ICICI, has increased its 
loan portfolio by U.S.$ 315 million in the past four years. There is 
increasing interest among private investors in microfinance investment. 
extended to incorporate individual lending later on. See http://calmeadow.com for more 
details. 
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The MIX market, attached to the World Bank, provides information about 
859 microfinance organizations and has a list of 74 U.S.-based funds to 
invest in (www.mixmarket.org). These funds transfer the money to banks 
who lend to local organizations. One of the largest is Accion 
(www.accion.org), a U.S. company that runs both equity and loan funds. It 
was set up in 2005 and allows investors to lend to microfinance units 
across the world. The minimum investment is U.S.$ 2,000 for 18 months 
which accrues up to 1.625 percent annual interest, paid semi-annually. 
Another organization is the Calvert Foundation which has a range of funds 
such as the Oikocredit World Partnership investment. The minimum 
investment is U.S.$ 1,000 and it provides a return of up to two percent. 
In India too, the concept of microfinance has gained much currency 
and financial regulators like the National Bank for Rural Development 
(NABARD) and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) have actively promoted it 
by providing increasing funding to MFIs6. Under the NABARD's Self-
Help Group (SHG) - Bank linkage model (which is different from the 
Grameen Bank model), SHGs bring together about 10-20 women who pool 
their savings for a few months, allocate them to members who need small 
amounts temporarily, thus making them eligible for a bank loan. 
Most of the discourse on microfinance is based on quantitative 
indicators such as the number of borrowers (outreach), lenders and loan 
6
 NABARD provides refinance to bank lending to MFIs and these are classified as 
priority sector lending targets. This method has been successful. Indeed, it is said about 
NABARD that it might be "the largest micro-credit program in the world with an 
outreach to nearly 24 million poor women" that have cumulatively received loans over 
Indian Rupees (Rs.) 68 billions from banks (Mahajan, 2005). 
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repayment rates. The first study in Bangladesh on the impact of micro-
credit projects in the country in 1991-1992 by the World Bank, found that 
the project yielded increased income as a result of increased micro-credit 
investments and that micro-credit had positive impacts on the school 
attendance of the borrowers' children (Khandker, 1998). But other studies 
have found that Grameen borrowers used their savings and household 
assets for weekly installment payments on micro-loans, resulting in further 
hardship to the poor (Rahman, 1999; Goetz and Gupta, 1996). Hence, in 
order to understand the extended impact of microfinance on the population 
of borrowers, it is necessary to look at the source of repayments, the 
ultimate beneficiary of credit, the nature of indebtedness, the empowerment 
of borrowers (especially women) and its contribution to social and 
economic development. 
The study is undertaken in Kerala, which is one of the most socially 
developed states in India with an enviable record in the quality of life when 
compared to the rest of the country. It has a long history of working-class 
and labor movement. The world's first democratically elected socialist 
government assumed office in 1957. Kerala is ahead of almost all Indian 
states in social indicators. Kerala had a relatively lower poverty ratio (9 
percent) as compared with the other states, the national average ratio being 
of 26 percent in 2003 (Government of Kerala, 2005b). This was achieved 
without commensurate economic development and this experience referred 
to in the literature as the 'Kerala model of economic development' 
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illustrates the role of public action in providing social goods and services 
even at low levels of economic growth. The sustainability of this model has 
been questioned by a number of researchers (Kannan, 1990; George, 1993; 
Tharamangalam, 1998) and by certain disturbing trends. Several factors 
have contributed to fueling much political and social tension in the state: 
large scale unemployment, mainly among the educated; deterioration in 
agriculture, especially the large drop in the total area under cultivation 
(including recently, the plantation sector); unfavorable credit scenario (low 
credit-deposit ratio); and the underdevelopment of the industry sector. 
These factors have also put poverty into the focus of public policy debates. 
It was in this background that in Kerala, the women-centered 
Kudumbashree program was initiated in 1998. The Kudumbashree program 
was initiated by the State Government and embraces a number of elements: 
micro-enterprises, insurance, education, old-age assistance, etc. The 
program seeks to eradicate absolute poverty within 10 years through 
coordinated community action under the leadership of local self-
governments. One of the main objectives of the Kudumbashree program is 
income promotion through the promotion of micro-enterprises. The income 
impact of micro-credit is a controversial area with most of the studies 
showing low-income impact (Copestake, Bhalotra and Johnson, 2001; 
MkNelly and Dunford, 1998, 1999; Mosley, 2001; Sebstad and Chen, 
1996; Todd, 2000). If micro-credit programs have low-income impact, an 
understanding of the reasons for such low impact could be useful from the 
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public policy angle. Further, recent research have provided evidences of 
microfmance leading to more debts and borrowers getting locked into a 
process of loan recycling (Todd, 1996; Murdoch, 1998, Rahman, 1999; 
Huq, 2001). It is in this background that we examine the financial and 
social impacts of Kudumbashree's micro-enterprise program. 
The main focus of the present study is to analyze the determinants 
of the repayment rate and the social impacts of the Kudumbashree micro-
credit program. 
The present study contributes to the literature in many ways. First, 
it is increasingly recognized that women share a grater burden of poverty 
within the household. Kudumbashree being a women-centered micro-credit 
program, it is interesting to examine how such a program contributes to the 
removal of gender inequalities and empowerment of women. Secondly, 
Kerala being a state with relatively low credit-deposit ratio and the poor 
depending on non-institutional sources of finance, the impact of 
microfmance borrowing on the indebtedness of borrowers, especially the 
issue of loan recycling and the vulnerability of the poor, is an interesting 
area of investigation. Thirdly, with Kerala leading the nation in almost all 
social indicators and having a high degree of social and political 
mobilization, the impact of programs like Kudumbashree could represent 
an alternative model of economic advancement. Fourthly, Kudumbashree 
represents an anti-thesis to the 'trickle-down' theory of economic 
development as it emphasizes active involvement of the poor in anti-
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poverty programs. Fifthly, with the increasing global integration of the 
Indian economy, farmers are being confronted with cheap foreign imported 
goods and led to a lack of remunerative prices for their products. 
Consequently, there have been widespread suicides of farmers many of 
them being in the State of Kerala7. The impact of programs like 
Kudumbashree on the socio-economic fabric of the farming communities 
represents another important area of investigation. 
The chapter scheme for this thesis goes as follow: chapter II 
discusses the Kerala model of development and sets the motivations for the 
study. Chapter III is devoted to the functioning and structure of the 
Kudumbashree organization and its micro-enterprise program. Chapter IV 
discusses the database for our study and also explains the methodology 
used in the empirical investigation. Chapter V analyzes the dynamics of the 
borrowers' repayment rate in the micro-enterprise program of 
Kudumbashree. Chapter VI focuses on the effect of the Kudumbashree 
organization on the social capital of its borrowers. Chapter VII summarizes 
the conclusions of this study. We have chosen to review the literature on 
the subject in the respective chapters (chapter V and VI). 
7
 According to unofficial estimates, about 75 persons, mostly small agriculturalists have 
committed suicide in the last five years (Government of Kerala, 2005b). 
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CHAPTER II 
KERALA MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN KERALA 
Kerala, the tiny state in the southwest corner of India with a 
population of 31.84 million (slightly lower than that of Canada), was little 
known outside of India even a decade ago (Chart 2.1). However the state 
slowly began to attract the attention of policy makers from all over the 
world due to its development experience called the 'Kerala model of 
economic development'. Kerala's attainment of social development with a 
low standard of living became an enigma in the development discourse. 
Dreze and Sen highlighted Kerala's development experience in their works 
on development (Dreze and Sen 1995, 1996). Similarly, the famous 
Monthly Review discussed Kerala's development experience in which 
Samir Amin commented that "...it is incorrect to think that nothing can be 
done without a revolution; on the contrary Kerala shows there is room for 
Q 
progressive reforms" (Amin, 1991) . The Kerala model of development 
attracted global attention and was often touted as a model of development 
for the Third World. In this chapter, we present the core features of the 
Kerala model of economic development - its strengths and weaknesses. 
The first section (Section 2.1) is devoted to describing the Kerala model of 
8
 For discussion on the debate, see Franke and Chasin (1991), Amin (1991) and 
Rammohan(1991). 
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economic development. The second section (2.2) examines the credit 
market situation in Kerala and provides the context and rationale for the 
study of the Kudumbashree micro-enterprise program. The last section 
summarizes the conclusions of this chapter. 
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Section 2.1: Kerala Model of Economic Development 
Kerala's development experience of achieving a fairly high level of 
well-being with a relatively low standard of income has been referred to in 
the development literature as the Kerala model of economic development. 
In less than 30 years, Kerala has made a transition from a society with high 
mortality and fertility rates to one having one of the highest life expectancy 
rates in India as well as having low death and birth rates. According to 
recent estimates, Kerala has achieved a life expectancy of around 74 years 
for 1993-1997. The life expectancy in Kerala (at 72 years in 1989-1993) 
was higher than that of all-India (59 years) and is comparable to the 
experiences of some of the advanced countries. In comparison to India, 
Kerala now has a low infant mortality rate (14 per thousand in 1999) and 
fertility rate (1.8 children per women in 1997-1998) (see Table 2.1 and 
Appendices 1 and 2.1 to 2.3). Kerala is one of the few states in India which 
has a favorable sex ratio - there are 1048 females per 1000 males. 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Social Indicators Between Kerala and India 
CDR PG LEB (years) IMR FR LR SR 
(000) 2001 1993-97 (000) 20 (%) (F/M) 
1999 M F 2000 01 2001 2001 
Kerala 6 4 093 704 753 14 L8 909 105.8 
India 8.7 1.95 60.4 61.8 71 3.3 65.2 96.2 
Notes: CDR stands for Crude Death Rate, PG for Population Growth, LEB for Life 
Expectancy at Birth, IMR for Infant Mortality Rate, FR for Fertility Rate, LR for Literacy 
Rate and SR for Sex Ratio. 
Source: Government of Kerala, 2005b 
Similarly, in the area of literacy, Kerala occupies the prime position 
in India with a literacy rate of 90.0 percent in 2001 as compared with an 
all-India average of 65.2 percent (Table 2.1 and Chart 2.2). Female literacy 
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rate (at 86.2 percent) was really three times that of the all-India picture 
(39.2 percent) (Government of Kerala, 2005b). Kerala has also a well-
developed education infrastructure with a near universality in primary 
education (Nair, 1999; Government of Kerala, 2005b). Kerala has one 
lower primary school for every square kilometer and one high school for 
every four square kilometers. Besides the state has one of the lowest drop-
out rates at the school level in the country - less than 10 percent in the 
1990s. In contrast to other states, the girls in Kerala have the lowest drop-
out rates. A variety of initiatives including social reforms, missionary and 
state interventions in the early part of the last century laid the foundation 
for gender parity in Kerala's education system. Public spending on 
education (as a proportion to the State Domestic Product (SDP) or total 
expenditure) has been among the highest in the country. More than 80 
percent of the education budget goes to school education. 
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These remarkable positive achievements in the educational, health 
and other social spheres were achieved in spite of the state being relatively 
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far behind other states in economic parameters. Economically, the 
development experience of the state of Kerala has been widely hailed and 
recognized in development discourse including World Development 
Reports, Human Development Reports and works of development scholars 
(Government of Kerala, 2005a). In terms of Human Development Index 
(1995) (Index of life expectancy, educational attainment and income), 
Kerala ranks first (0.628 in 2001) whereas for the country as a whole, it is 
only 0.451 (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Human Development Index of Major Indian States: 1981, 
1991 and 2001 
States 1981 1991 2001 
1 .Andhra 
Pradesh 
2.Assam 
3.Bihar 
4.Gujarat 
5.Haryana 
6.Karnataka 
7.Kerala 
8.Madhya 
Pradesh 
9.Maharashtra 
lO.Orissa 
11.Punjab 
12.Rajasthan 
13.Tamil 
Nadu 
14.Uttar 
Pradesh 
15.West 
Bengal 
All-India 
Index 
0.928 
0.272 
0.237 
0.360 
0.360 
0.346 
0.500 
0.245 
0.363 
0.267 
0.411 
0.256 
0.343 
0.255 
0.305 
0.302 
Rank 
9 
10 
15 
4 
5 
6 
1 
14 
3 
11 
2 
12 
7 
13 
8 
. 
Index 
0.377 
0.348 
0.308 
0.431 
0.443 
0.412 
0.591 
0.328 
0.452 
0.345 
0.475 
0.347 
0.466 
0.314 
0.404 
0.381 
Rank 
9 
10 
15 
6 
5 
7 
1 
13 
4 
12 
2 
11 
3 
14 
8 
. 
Index 
0.416 
0.386 
0.367 
0.479 
0.509 
0.478 
0.638 
0.394 
0.523 
0.404 
0.537 
0.424 
0.531 
0.388 
0.472 
0.472 
Rank 
10 
14 
15 
6 
5 
7 
1 
12 
4 
11 
2 
9 
3 
13 
8 
. 
Source: Government of Kerala (2005a) 
The intellectual discourse on Kerala's unique developmental 
experience was initiated by the study of the United Nations and Kerala's 
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Centre for Development Studies (UN and CDSK, 1975) with the support of 
the Committee on Development Planning of the Kerala unit. This study 
underscored the role of education in bringing a variety of positive changes 
in Kerala, including impressive health achievements. The UN and CDSK 
study evoked considerable interests toward the Kerala model of economic 
development among development scholars worldwide. 
Economic Indicators 
In terms of economic indicators, Kerala's per capita SDP is well 
below other better performing states like Punjab, Haryana or Maharashtra. 
Kerala's per capita SDP was only 88 percent of Punjab's per capita SDP in 
2005 (it was 56 percent in 1980-81) and almost the same as that of the all-
India average (Chart 2.3). In terms of the rate of growth of the per capita 
SDP, it is also the same as the one for all-India (14 percent for the 1990-91 
to 2004-05 period as compared with 15 percent for all-India), presumably 
due to low population growth (RBI, 2006). 
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Chart 2.3: Per Capita Income of Kerala, Punjab and India: 
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Table 2.3: Sectoral Composition of Kerala's Real Net State Domestic 
Product: 1971-2005 (in percent) 
Year 
1971 
1981 
1991 
2001 
2005 
Primary 
50.4 
39.5 
36.5 
32.7 
16.3 
Secondary 
16.6 
25.2 
23.8 
22.6 
11.6 
Tertiary 
33.0 
35.3 
39.7 
44.7 
72.1 
Total NSDP 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, 2006 
The traditional pattern of structural change that accompanies 
economic growth is a transformation from the primary (agricultural) sector 
to the secondary (industrial) sector and than to the tertiary (service) sector 
(Kuznets, 1957; Chenery, 1960, 1968, 1975). However, this pattern of 
development has not taken place in Kerala in the last 30 years. In Kerala, 
the share of the secondary (industrial) sector has remained more or less 
static or declined moderately (Table 2.3). The share of the primary 
(agriculture) sector has declined from 50.4 percent in 1971 to 16.3 percent 
in 2005. However, the share of the service sector has increased from 33 
percent in 1971 to 72.1 percent in 2005. The tertiary (service) sector which 
led the growth pattern in Kerala is at variance with traditional wisdom of 
patterns of economic growth (RBI, 2006). 
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Chart 2.4: Poverty Rate: Comparison between Kerala and India: 
1973-1974 and 1989-1990 
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Kerala's record in poverty reduction has also been impressive 
(Chart 2.4). The rural poverty rate in Kerala was higher than the one for all-
India in 1973-74 (59.2 percent as compared to 55.7 percent for all-India) 
and had fallen dramatically by 1999-2000 (to 9.4 percent as compared with 
26.8 percent for all-India). Similarly, the urban poverty rate also underwent 
21 
dramatic decline during the 1977-1999 period (Government of Kerala, 
2005b).9 
Kerala's development experience is often referred to as a paradox; a 
paradox of high quality of life despite poor economic growth. It is also 
referred to as a 'paradox of social development and economic 
backwardness'. However, the experiences of some of the countries in 
Europe and elsewhere have supported the theory that social development 
could trigger economic growth (Romer, 1986; Jones, 2001; Tamura, 2002, 
2006). 
Explanation of Kerala's Model of Economic Development 
There are a number of explanations to Kerala's unique development 
experience. Kerala's policy makers followed a successful 'basic-needs-
first' strategy that promoted empowerments of socio-economic standards of 
the population. The success in the socio-economic sphere has been 
attributed to successful land reforms - one of the most comprehensive land 
reforms in India (Herring, 1983) - and effective collective actions (Gulati, 
1990; Heller, 2000; Justino, 2006). Development experiences elsewhere 
suggest that land reforms could unleash productive forces in the economy. 
However, that has not happened in Kerala so far. Kerala's agriculture is 
experiencing slow growth. 
9
 In India, the poverty line is adapted to suit each state reality. States governments 
determine the necessary amount of money for one person to ingest the minimum amount 
of calories per month to remain in good health. For the year of 2003 in Kerala, this amount 
as been numbered at Rs. 400.43 per person per month in rural areas, and Rs. 536.56 per 
person per month in urban areas (Schreiner, 2006). 
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Historically, the Kerala economy had developed strong linkages 
with international markets. The large-scale emigration of people especially 
to the Persian Gulf region has strengthened those linkages and facilitated 
large-scale inflow of funds into the state. However, instead of being 
deployed in the state, these funds are being increasingly diverted to other 
states through financial intermediaries. 
Shortcomings of the Kerala Model of Development 
Despite the success on the social front, the state has experienced 
low levels of per capita income and weak performances in the agricultural 
and industrial sectors, the so-called gap between 'social development' and 
'material sector' (Krishnaji, 2007). One of the earlier criticism of the 
Kerala model came from the study made by K.K. George (1993) which 
looked at the issue of 'sustainability' of the Kerala model in terms of large 
public expenditures involved in supporting investment in education, health, 
etc. George explained the 'limits' of the Kerala model of economic 
development in term of constraints of the public finance situation in Kerala. 
The pattern of the service sector-oriented growth along with the state's 
commitment towards the education and health sectors have put 
considerable strain on the state's fiscal resources. The state has been 
consistently running high fiscal deficits and high levels of public debt. The 
worsening fiscal situation becomes apparent when one examines the trends 
in capital outlay to total expenditure: it has consistently shown a 
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deceleration in the last 10 years and has been declining at the rate of -5.5 
percent per annum (Chart 2.5). 
Source: RBI, Handbook of Indian Economy (Various Issues) 
Table 2.4: Incidence of Various Measures of Unemployment in Kerala 
and India (in percent) 
Various 
measures 
1977-
1978 
1999-
2000 
Kerala 
Chronic 
India 
Unemployment 
(UPS) 
19.8 
11.4 
5.5 
2.7 
^ _ _ ^ _ 
Kerala India 
Seasonal 
Unemployment 
(CWR) 
12.7 4.9 
12.7 4.3 
Kerala India 
Seasonal 
Unemployment (CDT) 
25.7 8.9 
21 7.3 
Notes: According to the Usual Principal Status method (UPS), the reference period is 365 
days preceding the date of survey. If a person is unemployed for a major period, he/she is 
unemployed by the UPS standard. Another measure is based on Current Weekly Status 
(CWS). As per this measure, if a person did not find work even for one hour in any day 
previous to the seven-day period, he/she is unemployed. The third measure is based on 
Current Daily Status (CDT) wherein each day of the previous seven days is classified as 
'working' or 'not working' based on one to four hours as half day and more than four 
hours as full day. 
Source: Government of Kerala, 2005b 
Apart from the weak economic performance, one could characterize 
Kerala as a Scandinavia of the Third World. Unique to Kerala, the social 
welfare programs have resulted in relatively higher wages in Kerala which 
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have created a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other low-welfare 
states/regions within India. This is reflected in the high unemployment rate 
in the state (Table 2.4). The rate of chronic unemployment (UPS) at 11.4 
percent in 1999-2000 was three times that of the Indian average (2.7 
percent). Similar trends are evident in other measures of unemployment, 
viz., seasonal unemployment (CWR and CDT). 
Table 2.5: Incidence of Chronic Unemployment According to 
Educational Attainments in Kerala: 1999-2000 
Below 
primary 
level of 
education 
Middle 
school 
level of 
education 
Secondary 
level of 
education 
Graduates 
and above 
Level of education 
separated by 
geographic location 
and gender 
Urban men 
Urban women 
Rural men 
Rural women 
Urban men 
Urban women 
Rural men 
Rural women 
Urban men 
Urban women 
Rural men 
Rural women 
Urban men 
Urban women 
Rural men 
Rural women 
Unemployment rate 
(in %) 
0.1 
0.3 
1.2 
1.3 
44.0 
20.3 
37.0 
20.9 
33.2 
36.9 
31.0 
37.5 
5.4 
21.6 
9.8 
24.9 
Ranking (from 
highest 
unemployment rate 
to the lowest) 
16 
15 
14 
13 
1 
10 
3 
9 
5 
4 
6 
2 
12 
8 
11 
7 
Source: Government of Kerala, 2005b 
What is surprising is the unemployment rate among the educated. 
The educated workforce has a higher unemployment rate than the 
uneducated workforce (Table 2.5). Many researchers have attributed the 
high unemployment rate in Kerala to the strength of militant labor 
movements (George, 1998; Kannan, 1990; Oommen, 1993; Prakash, 1994; 
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Tharamangalam, 1998). Another reason is that the Kerala model of 
development has been able to create a high literacy rate, but it has yet to 
create externalities for these literate people to take advantage of their value 
added which they gained via education (Government of Kerala, 2005b). 
Section 2.2 Credit Markets in Kerala 
The poor economic performance of the state is also reflected in 
Kerala's credit markets: the state has one of the lowest credit-deposit ratios 
in spite of a relatively well-developed financial system10. The population 
per bank office (PPO) in Kerala was of 11,000 in 2005 as compared with 
16,000 at the all-India average (Chart 2.6). Despite the high penetration of 
formal banking institutions in Kerala, the credit-deposit ratio in the state is 
one of the lowest in the country (Table 2.6). 
One distinguishing feature of the state's financial development is 
the large share of non-resident deposits in total bank deposits (in the range 
of 40 to 60 percent). But the credit-deposit ratio is far below that of other 
states and well below the national average (around 50 percent in recent 
times), leading to the argument that there is large-scale migration of credit 
to other states. The state government has consistently criticized the banks 
for their low credit-deposit ratio and some politicians have gone to the 
The credit-deposit ratio (defined as aggregate credit to aggregate deposit) is a broad 
measure of deployment of credit compared to the resources (deposits) of the formal 
banking system. This ratio gives the proportion of loan-assets created by commercial 
banks from the received deposits. Thus, if there are not enough assets created by banks, 
credit seekers will need to find other sources to obtain credit. 
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extent of arguing that they have been fleecing the customers in the state 
(Jeromi, 2002, 2004; Narayana, 2000). 
Table 2.6: Credit-Deposit Ratio in Kerala, South India and India: 
1969-2005 
Year 
1969 
1973 
1980 
1990 
1991 
1992 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Kerala 
64.9 
75.6 
67.5 
63.1 
59.1 
51.7 
41.5 
43.3 
43.3 
42.8 
45.5 
57.5 
61.7 
Credit-Deposit Ratio 
South India 
94.7 
97.3 
77.6 
83.2 
81.1 
76.5 
66.2 
66.6 
64.6 
66.3 
68.5 
78.1 
83.6 
India 
77.4 
69.1 
67.2 
60.7 
61.9 
57.7 
56.0 
56.7 
58.4 
59.2 
58.2 
66.0 
72.5 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Banking Statistics and Trend and Progress of Banking in 
India (Various Issues) 
Chart 2.6: Credit-Deposit Ratio in Kerala and India 
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Table 2.7: Trends in Number Credit Accounts in Kerala and in India: 
1973 to 2005 (in 000s) 
Kerala India 
1973 
1980 
1990 
1991 
1992 
2000 
2005 
977 
359 
4,133 
4,232 
3,854 
39,044 
46,580 
4,682 
18,034 
53,850 
61,947 
65,861 
54,370 
77,151 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Banking Statistics (Various issues) 
The low credit-deposit ratio has also attracted adverse comments 
from policy makers and politicians in Kerala. In October 2002, Mr. A.K. 
Antony, the then Chief Minister, said: 
"The functioning of the nationalized banks, which 
mobilized huge deposits from Kerala, was neither 
beneficial to the State Government nor to the development 
of the State. What is the use of such banks, which 
mobilized deposits only to lend them elsewhere? Their 
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attitude is totally against their basic objectives." (K.G. 
Kumar, 2002)n 
The above remark typically reflected the criticism that has come 
from other prominent public figures including that of Prof. I.S. Gulati, 
former Chairman of the State Planning Board, Kerala. The essence of the 
criticism is that banks are being overly conservative in Kerala, and are not 
lending enough, especially to the poor. The confrontation between public 
authorities and commercial banks over the declining credit-deposit ratio of 
banks in Kerala took a serious turn in April 1997 when the State Planning 
Board asked the government to end all financial deals with public sector 
banks which had a credit-deposit ratio of less than 40 percent. 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the decline in the credit-
deposit ratio in the state of Kerala is the decline in the number of credit 
accounts since 1991 (Table 2.7). The slashing of credit accounts 
(presumably to clean the non-performing loans) was in response to the 
introduction in 1992 of the Basel bank capital standards in India. Since 
1991-1992, the number of credit accounts in the state declined by 9.8 
percent and this trend continued until 1999. On the other hand, there was 
11
 See the report of Mr. Anthony's speech in the article written by Kumar (2002) in the 
Business Line online newspaper, October 28, 2002 titled 'Bank Balance of an Over-
banked State. Also available at 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2002/10/28/stories/2002102800040200.htm 
12
 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) headquartered in Basel, Switzerland had 
presented capital standards for banks worldwide. The idea behind introducing capital 
standards is to protect banks' capital. The introduction of capital standards in India was in 
1992 (in the 1980s in North America) distorted the risk taking behavior of banks. Instead 
of expanding the loan portfolio (which had 100 percent risk weights) banks found it easy 
to achieve capital standards by expanding investment in government securities (which has 
zero risk weights). See Bernanke and Lown (1991). 
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no decline in the deposit accounts in the state during the period (RBI, 
Banking Statistics, Various issues). 
Chart 2.7: Incidence of Indebtedness of Households in Rural and 
Urban Areas, Kerala and India: 1971-2002 
a) Rural Areas 
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to toil 
Kerala India Kerala India Kerala India 
1981 1991 2002 Incidence of Indebtedness of Households 
b) Urban Areas 
Kerala India 
1981 
Kerala India 
1991 
Kerala India 
2002 
Incidence of Indebtedness of Households 
Source: Government of India (2005). Household assets and liabilities in India (As on June 
30, 2002), NSSO 
The slashing of credit accounts, presumably small credit accounts, 
had a profound impact on the livelihood of the poor. This is evident from 
the rising indebtedness of rural and urban households in Kerala in the 
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1990s. Chart 2.7 reports the level of indebtedness of households in rural 
and urban areas in different states in India for the period of 1971 - 2002. 
The indebtedness of households in Kerala in both rural and urban areas has 
risen from 1971 to 2002. Indeed, among Indian states in 2002, Kerala ranks 
second and first in rural and urban indebtedness respectively (Government 
of India, 2005). The high and increasing indebtedness of Kerala's 
households (both rural and urban) indicates the increasing vulnerability of 
the poor. In recent years inside the state, the number of farmer suicides has 
been on the rise and has added a new dimension to the agrarian crisis 
(Government of Kerala, 2005b). Although the number of farmer suicides is 
relatively small as a proportion of the total rural households, they highlight 
the emotional and economic trauma that surviving members of the family 
have to endure. 
Another interesting aspect of the indebtedness of rural households 
in both rural and urban areas is the fact that nearly 82 percent of the debt is 
from the formal sector of which banks are a major component. The 
remaining 18 percent of the farming household debt is from the informal 
sector, which is relatively low compared to the all-India picture 
(Government of India, 2005). But this is not a consolation given the fact 
that interest rates generally charged by this sector are well beyond those 
charged by the formal financial system. In India, studies have shown that 
interest rates charged by moneylenders for more than half of their loans 
were 60 percent or more (Dasgupta and CPS Nayar, 1989). Based on a 
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survey done in two villages in South India, Swaminathan (1991) reports 
that the average interest rate charged on loans varied between 14.8 percent 
for loans collateralized by immovable properties and 60 percent for loans 
backed by movable assets. An empirical study have shown that suicide 
households have relatively (a) higher level of total debt, (b) higher 
dependence on informal sectors (like moneylenders, traders etc) and (c) 
higher proportion of debt for non-productive purposes like consumption, 
social ceremony, illness etc. (Vaidyanathan, 2006). 
Section 2.3 Conclusion 
The Kerala model of economic development is a unique experience 
in development economics. The achievement of high levels in social 
indicators (like literacy, life expectancy) without commensurate economic 
development has remained as an enigma in development discourse. 
Nevertheless, the Kerala model has some major weaknesses like 
the high unemployment (especially among the educated) and worsening 
credit situation in the state in spite of the spread of formal financial 
institutions. The situation becomes all the more distressing when one 
considers the fact that the state attracts a large proportion of deposits from 
non-residents. The lack of credit disbursement especially to the poor 
(small accounts) despite the large accretion of resources raises the 
question of large-scale credit migration and credit rationing by formal 
financial institutions like banks. It is in this context that the relevance of 
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micro-credit units like Kudumbashree has to be viewed. Organizations like 
Kudumbashree aim to provide small loans to the poor by linking the 
savings of the poor with banks' finance under a group loan scheme. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to a detailed discussion of this aspect. 
33 
CHAPTER III 
THE KUDUMBASHREE PROGRAM 
The Kudumbashree program was started in the state of Kerala in 
1998 under a state poverty eradication program. Literally translated, 
Kudumbashree means welfare (or prosperity) of the family. It is a unique 
micro-credit program with partnership between the Government of India, 
Government of Kerala, local bodies and NABARD. The original objective 
of the program was to eliminate poverty from the state of Kerala within a 
decade (ending in 2008). This chapter discusses the salient features of the 
Kudumbashree program and its role in poverty alleviation in Kerala. 
Section 1 discusses the rural credit situation in India and the various 
intervention measures undertaken to help the poor at the national level (all-
India) and sets the background for the relevance of micro-credit programs 
like Kudumbashree in Kerala, India. Section 2 discusses the main elements 
and functioning of the Kudumbashree program. Section 3 brings forth the 
conclusions of this chapter. 
Section 3.1: Rural Credit Situation in India 
The organized financial system in India consists of commercial and 
cooperative banks. Commercial banks, which include foreign banks, are the 
pre-dominant segment. Cooperative banks, which are organized on the 
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'unit' banking principle, are mainly rural-based. Besides, government-
owned post offices mobilize deposits but they do not undertake any lending 
activity. Scheduled commercial banks constituted about 97 percent of the 
total deposits of the banking system in March 1951. 
During the post-1969 period, the banking system experienced a 
phenomenal expansion of branches in the semi-urban and rural areas of the 
country. The population per bank office which was around 64,000 in 1969 
showed a dramatic decline and was around 14,000 by 1991. The dramatic 
expansion of bank branches in rural and semi-urban areas was made 
possible by the 'branch licensing' policy implemented by the RBI (which is 
the central bank in India) which granted licenses for the opening of new 
branches mainly in the rural and semi-urban areas. This substantially 
boosted savings in the form of financial assets (especially currency and 
bank deposits as a proportion of savings) from five percent in 1969 to 15 
percent in 1991. During the social phase of banking, interest rates on 
deposits and loans were administered with the priority sector including the 
informal sector getting a lower interest rate prescription. Banks were 
required to lend 40 percent of their credit to 'priority sectors' (agriculture, 
small-scale industry, retail trade etc). The lending to the private corporate 
sector was greatly restricted using the inventory and receivable norms 
prescribed under the Credit Authorisation Scheme administered by the RBI 
(the central bank as well as its financial regulator). The restrictions of 
banks' balance sheets by the RBI were offset by a system of compensatory 
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finances (refinances and interest payments on cash reserve holdings with 
the central bank13). 
During the social phase of banking in India, credit growth on 
average was in tune with the rate of growth output and is often referred to 
in the literature as financial deepening. During this financial deepening 
phase in India (1969-1991), there was a decisive shift in the sectoral 
distribution of credit in favor of the priority sector (including the informal 
sector). Credit to priority sectors formed only a very small proportion of 
the total bank credit on the eve of bank nationalization (14 percent). 
However, this proportion increased to nearly 38 percent by March 1991 
which considerably increased the accessibility of bank finance for small 
and poor borrowers. Moreover, this measure also contributed to the 
widening of the demand base of the economy and more dispersed growth 
across regions in India. 
The faster growth in credit (especially the supply induced credit 
growth) created problems of loan quality. By 1991, non-performing assets 
occupied nearly 28 percent of loan accounts and 27.5 percent of the 
outstanding bank credit of scheduled commercial banks; the share of 
priority sectors credit which contributed 38 percent of bank credit 
13
 Cash reserve ratio is a reserve requirement; the minimum is three percent and 
maximum limit is 15 percent. The statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) stipulates that banks 
invest at least a minimum of 25 percent of its net demand and time liabilities in 'liquid' 
assets. Liquid assets were defined as government treasury bills and bonds. At the time of 
the balance of payment crisis in June 1991, statutory preemptions occupied nearly 53.5 
percent of net demand and time liabilities of scheduled commercial banks in India. The 
level of statutory preemptions has been reduced over a period of time from 53.5 percent 
in 1991-1992 to 29.5 percent in 2003-2004 (RBI, 2006). 
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contributed to nearly one-half of non-performing assets in 1995 (RBI, 
1998). This created issues of sustainability in the priority sectors lending 
programs of the banks. 
The social banking phase was broken by the economic crisis in 
India in June 1991 when the country faced a severe balance of payments 
problem resulting in the country seeking a loan from the IMF which in turn 
triggered a host of reforms in the fiscal, monetary, real and financial 
sectors. The financial sector reforms introduced in the country in 1992, 
based on the recommendations of the Committee on Financial Sector 
Reforms (popularly known as Narasimham Committee Report) (RBI, 
1991), is the second major event on the financial landscape of India. 
During this phase, the administrative interest rate structure was dismantled 
and banks were given greater flexibility in taking decisions on their balance 
sheets. Besides, a number of prudential measures including the introduction 
of capital adequacy, income recognition and asset classification based on 
international norms were introduced as part of the financial sector reform 
agenda. 
To promote financial stability, one of the important instruments 
advocated by the Narasimham Committee Report was the internationally 
accepted capital adequacy norm. Banks were advised to meet the capital 
adequacy of eight percent of their risk-weighted assets by 1995. On the 
monetary side, the RBI scaled down the statutory preemptions in the form 
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of cash reserve ratio and statutory liquidity ratio mainly with the idea of 
providing additional liquidity to banks for their lending. But contrary to 
expectations, credit-deposit ratio witnessed a dramatic fall from 61.9 
percent in 1991 to 55.6 percent in 1995 fuelling a credit crunch crisis. 
Along with the dramatic fall in the credit-deposit ratio in the 
banking sector in India, the indebtedness of rural households in India as 
well as the share of institutional credit have shown a decline during 1991-
2002. Data on all-India rural credit or debt and investment surveys provide 
estimates of household indebtedness divided between institutional and non-
institutional sources. The data show that the institutional agencies have 
accounted for an increasing share of total cash dues outstanding of rural 
households, rising from about 29 percent in 1971 to 64 percent in 1991 
(Table 3.1). Considering only the cultivator households, the share of 
institutional debt had expanded from 31.7 percent to 66 percent during the 
period. Since 1992, the situation has changed dramatically: the share of 
institutional source of finance has declined to 58 percent in 2002 (from 
66.3 percent in 1991) and that of non-institutional sources like 
moneylender has increased to 42.3 percent in 2002 (from 30.6 percent in 
1991). Among the non-institutional sources of finance, the share of 
moneylender who charges exorbitant rates of interest increased from 17 
percent in 1991 to 26 percent in 2002. According to a survey done by the 
World Bank (2003) 70 percent of the landless marginal farmers did not 
have a bank account and 87 percent had no access to credit from formal 
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institutions. This raises a number of issues, including the question of 
financial exclusion. 
Table 3.1: Relative Share of Borrowing (from Different Sources) of 
Cultivator Households in India: 1951-2003 (in percent) 
Sources of credit 
Institutional 
Coop Soc/Banks, etc. 
Commercial Banks 
Non-Institutional 
Moneylenders 
Unspecified 
Total 
1951 
7.3 
3.3 
0.9 
92.7 
69.7 
-
100.0 
1961 
18.7 
2.6 
0.6 
81.3 
49.2 
-
100.0 
1971 
31.7 
22.0 
2.4 
66.3 
36.1 
-
100.0 
1981 
63.2 
29.8 
28.8 
36.8 
16.1 
-
100.0 
1991 
66.3 
30.0 
35.2 
30.6 
17.5 
3.1 
100.0 
2002 
57.7 
19.6 
35.6 
42.3 
25.7 
-
100.0 
Notes: Borrowing refers to outstanding cash dues. 
Source: Government of India, Debt and Investment Surveys (Various Issues). 
Rural Development: Government Interventions 
The main foundation of the Indian Government's interventions in 
rural areas as part of its anti-poverty programs in the last four decades is 
the self-employment program in rural areas called the Integrated Rural 
Development Program (IRDP)14 which concentrated on providing credit 
(and/or subsidy) to individuals for their self-employment activities. The 
program included a skill development component and also a provision for 
the promotion of marketing of products/services. The underlying 
assumption was that the lack of productive assets was responsible for the 
poor being unable to ameliorate their lot. The other anti-poverty program in 
India was the rural public works program called the National Food for 
Work Program. Over the years, there were enhanced outlays on these 
programs. However, studies have shown that these programs did not cover 
The IRDP program was launched in 1980. 
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a large segment of the rural poor and their impacts were negligible. 
Similarly, the performance of formal financial institutions in their lending 
to the poor in India was also not satisfactory. After the introduction of the 
financial sector reforms in 1991 in India, lending to the poor especially to 
the priority sector has suffered. It is in this context that there is a growing 
interest in alternative credit delivery mechanisms like microfinance 
programs. In the delivery of small loans to the poor (micro-credit) there are 
five distinct approaches: 
(i)The Grameen and Solidarity Model: 
In the Grameen Bank15 model, poor households form groups of 
three to eight persons (usually five) on the condition that each of them 
would be assuming responsibility for the lending and other financial 
operations of the other members of the group. Lending as well as 
repayment goes directly to and from the individuals with the guarantee of 
the other group members. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has 
popularized this methodology and it has been adopted in many countries, 
each program implementing necessary modifications to adapt this model to 
its environment. Programs, like BancoSol in Bolivia, and most of the 
solidarity group models in Latin America follow this methodology. 
15
 Information about this model is readily available on the Grameen Bank website at 
http://www.grameen-info.org. 
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(ii) Individual Credit: 
Credit given directly to the individual also forms part of the micro-
credit programs. Priority sector lending by commercial banks, cooperative 
banks and RRBs in India were developed along this program. In India, this 
type of program created problems of repayment (non-performing loans) 
which raised the issue of sustainability of the banking system in the long 
run. In Indonesia, the BRI-Unit Desa is an example of this type of lending. 
(iii) Credit Unions and Cooperatives: 
Credit unions and cooperatives are member-owned organizations 
providing credit and other financial services to their members. SANASA of 
Sri Lanka is a successful example of rural credit cooperatives providing 
microfinance. The main problem with this approach is the limitation of 
resources. 
(iv) The Group Approach: 
Under the group approach, savings, loans and loan repayment are 
undertaken at the group level. These groups are linked to financial or 
microfinance institutions. The SHG-Bank Linkage model widely used in 
India as a microfinance delivery platform is an example of this. We discuss 
in detail in the following paragraphs the evolution of the SHG-Bank 
Linkage model in India. 
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(v) Community Banking: 
This model is an extension of the group approach wherein the basic 
financial necessities of the poor are met through the community banking 
systems. Community banks borrow from program agencies and lend to 
their members. An example of this type of lending is the FINCA in Latin 
America and is also widely replicated in programs in Africa and Central 
Asia. 
Beginning of Microfinance in India 
Microfinancing by 'non-formal' financial organizations had been in 
existence in India for a number of years prior to the NABARD's SHG-
Bank Linkage plan. The SEWA (Self-Employed Women's Association) 
bank owned by women of petty trade groups was established on the basis 
of the cooperative principles in 1974 in the state of Gujarat. Working 
Women Forum (WWF) has started promoting working women's 
cooperative societies in Tamil Nadu since 1980. The Shreyas in Kerala got 
actively involved in microfinance operations since 1988 with the objective 
of promoting people's cooperatives, habits of thrift and self-managing 
people's banks. 
The first official interest in informal group lending in India took 
shape during 1986-1987 when NABARD supported and funded an action 
research project on 'Savings and Credit Management of the Self-Help 
Groups' of Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency (MYRADA). 
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In 1988-1989, NABARD undertook a survey of 43 Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) spread over 11 states in India to study the 
functioning of SHGs, and the possibilities of collaboration between banks 
and SHGs to enhance the mobilization of rural savings and improve the 
delivery of credit to the poor. 
Encouraged by the NABARD survey results, the RBI came out with 
a circular on July 24, 1991 advising commercial banks (and later, RRBs 
and cooperative banks) to extend credit to the SHGs under the pilot project 
of NABARD. During the project period, the Association of Sarva Seva 
Farms (ASSEFA), Chennai, promoted 214 groups, mobilized Rs. 1.4 
million of thrifts and disbursed credit of Rs. 2.3 million; People's Rural 
Education Movement (PREM) in Behrampur promoted 829 groups, 
mobilized Rs. 1.9 million of thrifts and disbursed credit of Rs. 1.9 million: 
Professional Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN), in Madura, 
promoted 313 groups, mobilized Rs. 1.3 million of thrifts and disbursed 
credit of Rs. 3.9 million; Community Development Society (CDS) which is 
the forerunner of the Kudumbashree program, in the city of Alappuzha in 
Kerala, promoted 350 groups, mobilized Rs. 2 million of thrifts and 
disbursed credit of Rs. 4.7 million. These programs have played a catalyst 
role in propagating microfinance as a mean to help the poor. 
To formalize the mechanism further, the RBI constituted a working 
group in November 1994 to review the functioning of the NGOs and SHGs 
and make suitable recommendations for expanding their activities and 
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strengthening their role in the rural sector. Accepting the recommendation 
in April 1996, the RBI advised banks that lending to SHGs should be 
considered as an additional segment under 'priority sector advances' and 
integrated with the mainstream credit operation. 
SHG-Bank Linkage Model: Linking Banks with the Poor 
The SHG is defined as a voluntary group valuing personal 
interactions and mutual aid as a mean to reduce the members' problems in 
a group. These groups are voluntary associations of people formed to attain 
certain collective goals that could be economic, social or both. Over the 
years, SHGs have evolved in a system for collective savings, consumption 
and credit as well as integrating social and economic goals among small 
groups. 
Based on the successful experiences of the SHG approach inside 
and outside India, the Central (federal) Government of India decided to 
shift the focus from individuals to groups by starting a new program called 
Swarnajayanthi Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) which decided to focus 
mainly on the SHGs as an instrument of self-employment and poverty 
reduction in the country's rural areas. In India, three types of SHG models 
have emerged: 
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1. Bank-SHG-Members: The bank itself acts as a Self-Help Group 
Promoting Institution (SHPI). 
2. Bank-Facilitating Agency-SHG-Members: Facilitating agencies like 
NGOs, government agencies, or other community-based 
organizations form groups. 
3. Bank-NGO-MFI-SHG-Members: NGOs act both as facilitators and 
microfinance intermediaries. First they promote groups, nurture 
them, and train them, and then they approach banks for bulk loans 
for lending to the SHGs. 
The second model, where SHGs were formed and nurtured by a 
facilitating agency, was more popular among bankers. Banks opened 
saving accounts and then provided credit directly to the SHGs, while NGOs 
acted as facilitators. This approach has been widely accepted by the 
practitioners partly because of the large scale participation of state 
governments through development agencies like the District Rural 
Development Agency (DRDA), District Women Development Agency 
(DWDA), and also because of special initiatives of NABARD. 
Under the third model, NGOs acted as facilitators as well as 
microfinance intermediaries. NGOs formed SHG federations and then 
facilitated them to assume the role of MFIs. This model is popular with 
smaller banks entering into large scale financing of SHGs (Bansal, 2003). 
Among the three models of delivery of SHG-bank linkages, the 
most popular in the country was the second model. It accounts for 72 
percent of SHGs and 81 percent of SHG credit for the year of 2004. For the 
state of Kerala, 'model 2' was also the predominant one: it accounts for 40 
percent of SHG and 49 percent of SHG credit outstanding (R. Dasgupta, 
2005). 
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The SHG became a regular component of the Indian financial 
system since 1996. These SHGs are small (not more than 20 members 
each), informal and homogeneous. The maximum size of 20 has been made 
mandatory because any group larger than this would need to be registered 
under the Indian legal system . These groups are expected to foster 
democratic culture where all the members participate actively by taking 
part in the debate and decision-making process. When groups become 
larger, monitoring of peers become difficult and decision-making becomes 
less democratic. The size of a SHG at a maximum of 20 is at variance with 
the Grameen Bank model which consists of usually five members (Table 
3.2). 
By linking the informal with the Formal Finance Institutions (FFIs), 
Indian FFIs solve the problems of transaction costs and default risks. This 
method as been beneficial to FFIs as well as to SHGs (Harper, Berkhof and 
Ramakrishna, 2005). The informal institution (SHG) operates in a market 
where it possesses all necessary information about its clients. It provides a 
doorstep service, accepts deposits and give credits of any amount (provided 
that SHGs respect their contracts), and especially, is simple to operate for 
the poor. The result is that when the SHG goes to a FFI to do financial 
activities, the SHG will bear the major part of the transaction costs and 
credit risks (Dasgupta, 2005). 
16
 Most of the MFIs will allow only one member of a household to participate in their 
financial programs. This way, microfinance programs are profitable to more people and 
they are also safer. 
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Table 3.2: Operational Features of Different Microfinance Models in 
India 
Operational 
features 
Clients 
Groups 
Service 
focus 
Meetings 
Savings 
deposits 
Interest on 
savings 
Initial loan 
size 
Effective 
interest rate 
(usual range) 
Insurance 
Kudumbashree 
Primarily 
women 
10 to 40 clients 
per group 
Savings and 
credit - regular 
cycle 
Weekly 
Rs.lOand 
onwards 
5% 
Rs. 100 to 
5,000 
10% 
At a very prelim 
SHG 
Primarily 
women 
15 to 20 
clients per 
group 
Savings and 
credit 
Monthly 
Rs.20-100/ 
month 
Bank rate 
(4.25%) 
Rs. 5-
10,000 
24 - 28% 
inary stage: usi 
Grameen Bank 
(Bangladesh) 
Primarily 
women 
Usually 5 
clients per 
group. 
Credit -
regular cycle 
Weekly 
Rs.5-25 / 
month 
6 - 9 % 
Rs. 2-5,000 
32 - 38% 
lally loan linked, 
Individual 
Banking 
Primarily 
men 
Individual 
clients 
Credit 
Individual 
transaction -
often daily 
Flexible 
6% + 
Rs. 5-15,000 
Rs. 35,000 
23 - 38% 
some Life and 
Health; Sometimes, links to national companies 
Development Training and Some A few small Enterprise 
services some associated social projects support 
associated programs 
programs 
Source: Sinha, 2005. 
SHGs, after being formed, were encouraged to form thrift and credit 
societies (TCSs) among participating members. The thrifts raised by SHGs 
are given back to its members as loans for meeting consumption purposes 
as well as contingent needs. The repayment of the loans (principal and 
interest) along with the regular thrifts enlarge the working fund of SHGs 
but may not be sufficient to meet all members types of credit needs (like 
micro-enterprises). It is at this juncture that SHGs are linked with banks. 
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The group (SHG) approaches a financial intermediary (normally the one 
with which the group had opened the savings account) for a 'group loan'. 
The bank evaluates the group based on (i) genuineness of demand for 
credit, (ii) credit handling capacity of the members, (iii) group's repayment 
behavior and (iv) accounting system and maintenance of records 
(NABARD, 2005). 
For SHG-Bank linkage, NABARD has stipulated certain norms for 
linking SHG to banks viz. (i) the group should have been existing for at 
least six months and (ii) SHGs should get an adequate rating based on a 15-
points index (Table 3.3). This framework was later adopted (with 
modifications/enhancements) by many banks to evaluate SHGs applying 
for bank-linkage. In fact many banks have extended this model to a scale 
ranging from 100 to 150 points. SHGs which meet these criteria are linked 
with bank credit. In the first stage of the scheme, the SHGs are eligible for 
credit equivalent to their thrift. Subsequently repeat loans could be availed 
of at the thrift-credit ratio of 1:2 and higher, depending on the repayment 
performance of the groups. 
48 
Table 3.3: Parameters for the Assessment of NHGs - NABARD 
Framework 
SI. 
No 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Factors to be 
checked 
Group Size 
Type of 
members 
Number of 
Meetings in a 
month 
Timings of 
meetings 
Attendance of 
members 
Participation 
of members 
Savings 
collection 
within the 
group 
Amount to be 
saved. 
Interest on 
internal loan 
Utilization of 
savings by 
NHGs 
Loan 
recoveries 
Maintenance 
of books 
Accumulated 
Savings 
Knowledge of 
rules of NHGs 
Education 
level 
Knowledge of 
Government 
programs 
Very good 
15-20 
Only very poor 
members 
4 
Night or after 
6.00 pm 
>90% 
High level 
4 times a month 
Fixed 
Depending on 
purpose 
Fully used for 
loaning to 
members. 
More than 90%. 
All books 
regularly 
maintained and 
updated. 
> Rs. 5,000 
Known to all. 
> 20 % of 
members can 
read and write. 
All are aware of 
government 
programs. 
Rating 
Good 
10-15 
2-3 not very poor 
members 
2 
Morning between 7 & 
9 am 
70-90% 
Medium level 
Three times a month 
Varying 
24 to 36% 
Partly used for loaning. 
70-90%. 
Important registers are 
updated. 
Rs.3,000- 5,000 
Many members know 
the rules. Some have 
little knowledge of it 
20 to 30% members 
can read and write. 
Many members know 
about the government 
programs 
Unsatisfactory 
< 10 
Many not poor 
members 
<2 
Other timings 
<70% 
Low level. 
< 3 times a 
month. 
-
More than 36%. 
Poor utilization. 
<70% 
Irregular in 
maintaining 
books. 
< Rs. 3,000 
Not known to 
all. 
< 20 percent 
know to read 
and write. 
No one knows. 
Source: NABARD (2005) Banking with Self-Help Groups: How and Why-A Handbook for 
Branch Level Bankers 
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Table 3.4 reports the progress of the SHG-Bank linkage program in 
India during 1993 to 2006. The number of SHGs linked with banks from 
1992 - 2006 has gone up substantially (255 in 1992-1993 to 2,238,565 in 
2005-2006) (NABARD, various issues). Thus, there is a tremendous 
upscaling of this program in India. The loan per SHG under the SHG-Bank 
linkage program has also increased from Rs. 11,373 in 1992-1993 to 
Rs.50,915 in 2005-2006. 
Table 3.4: SHG - Bank Linkage: Cumulative Progress (1992-2006) 
Up to end 
of March 
1992-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005-2006 
No. of 
SHGs 
financed 
32,995 
114,775 
263,825 
461,478 
717,360 
1,079,091 
1,618,456 
2,238,565 
Bank Loan (in 
Rs. million) 
571 
1,930 
4,809 
10,263 
20,487 
39,042 
68,985 
113,975 
Source: NABARD, Annual Report (Various issues). 
Loan per SHG 
(in Rs.) 
17,305.65 
16,815.51 
18,227.99 
22,239.41 
28,558.88 
36,180.45 
42,623.96 
50,914.31 
Rate of 
Growth (per 
year in %) 
-
-2.83 
8.40 
22.01 
28.42 
26.69 
17.81 
19.45 
Table 3.5 shows the region-wise distribution of SHG - Bank 
linkage program in India during 1996 - 2006. Nearly three fourth of SHGs 
linked to banks in 2001 was in the southern region. Kerala is the third 
largest (next only to Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh) in the country in the 
matter of SHG linkage to banks. Kerala accounted for roughly 13 percent 
of the total linked groups in 2006 (NABARD, Annual Report, 2006). 
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Table 3.5: SHG - Bank Linkage in India: Regional Distribution, 1996-
2006 (in percent) 
As of the end of March 
Region 
Northern 
North-Eastern 
Eastern 
Central 
Western 
Southern 
All-India 
1996 
0 
1* 
13 
10 
3 
69 
100 
1997 
4 
1* 
13 
12 
7 
63 
100 
1998 
3 
1* 
13 
11 
10 
62 
100 
1999 
3 
1* 
10 
11 
10 
65 
100 
2001 
3 
1* 
8 
11 
6 
71 
100 
2006 
6 
3 
18 
12 
7 
54 
100 
Note: * is less than 1 percent. 
Source: NABARD, Annual Report (Various issues). 
SHG Vs NHG 
The main difference between the SHG and the Neighborhood 
Group (NHG) is that SHGs are non-governmental and informal 
organizations promoted by voluntary agencies. NHGs are promoted by the 
government for the upliftment of the poor, especially women, by bringing 
together the activities of various development departments. 
Section 3.2: The Kudumbashree Program 
Kudumbashree- A Brief History 
The forerunner to the Kudumbashree program was the successful 
implementation of a poverty eradication program through CDSs in two 
backward districts of Kerala (Alleppey and Malappuram). This program 
was co-sponsored by the Government of Kerala, local bodies and UNICEF. 
The origin of this program can be traced into the Urban Poverty Alleviation 
and Urban Basic Services Programs which were launched during the 
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Seventh Five Year Plan by the Kerala Government that had a special 
emphasis on women and children. 
Kudumbashree is a women-centered initiative against poverty that 
has been in operation in the state of Kerala since 1998 in rural areas and 
since 2000 in urban areas. The success of the CDS of Alleppey and 
Malappuram prompted the Government of Kerala to adopt CDSs of poor 
women as a meaningful strategy to achieve development with their active 
participations. The CDS system acts as a sub-system of the local 
government (panchayat and municipalities) and takes decentralization of 
power further down to the grassroots level . The program was initially 
implemented in 13 towns in the districts of Alleppey and Ernakulam, and 
later extended during the Eighth Five Year Plan to 16 more towns and then 
to the entire Malappuram district. The coverage of the program was 
extended to all gram panchayats in a phased manner in 2000-2001. The 
basic thrust of the program is women as they are more likely to be credit 
constrained, have restricted access to the wage labor market and have an 
inequitable share of power in household decision making. 
Principal objectives of the Kudumbashree program are (i) 
facilitating self-identification of poor families through a poverty risk index, 
(ii) empowering the women of the poor strata to improve their individual 
17
 The government in India is organized in a three-tier structure: Central (federal), State 
(provincial) and local. The local government in India (the lower tier of the government) is 
divided as Corporation, Municipality and Panchayat. The classification of local 
government as Corporation, Municipality and Panchayat is based on population. Local 
governments with large population (mostly urban centers) are named as Corporation 
followed by Municipality and Panchayat. 
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and collective capabilities by organizing themselves into NHGs, (iii) 
encouraging thrift and investment through credit by developing community 
development societies to work as informal banks of the poor, (iv) 
improving incomes of the poor through upgrades of vocational and 
managerial skills and the creation of opportunities for self-employment and 
wage employment, (v) ensuring access to basic amenities like safe drinking 
water, sanitary facilities, improved shelter and healthy living environment 
and (vii) promoting functional literacy among the poor and supporting 
continuing education. Thus, the program covers not only credit but also a 
number of non-credit services (like insurance, vocational training, literacy, 
1 0 
leadership skills, social empowerment, etc.) . 
Kudumbashree units, like other micro-credit programs, start with 
mobilization of thrifts. Each household contributes a minimum of Rs. 10 
per month, which form the basis of the savings pool of the NHG and these 
are normally deposited in a bank in the name of the NHG. The NHG 
volunteers for income generations collect thrift (small savings) from 
members every week. The thrift raised by the NHGs is given back to its 
members as loan for meeting consumption purposes as well as for meeting 
contingent needs such as medical treatment, birth delivery, death, education 
of children, marriage, repayment of old debt, etc. The repayment of the 
loans (principal and interests) along with regular thrifts enlarge the working 
fund of SHGs. Notwithstanding, the generated working fund may not be 
sufficient to meet all types of credit needs for all members. During this 
18
 For more details, see www.kudumbashree.org. 
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period, groups are expected to open a savings account with a financial 
intermediary in order to meet the growing demand for credit and especially 
to meet the needs of strengthening/diversification and starting of income 
generation activities (like micro-enterprises). NHGs act as an effective MFI 
and are the grassroots level unit of the poor women which promotes thrift 
among poor families. 
Table 3.6: Progress of Kudumbashree Program in Kerala: 1999-2006 
1999-00 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
No. of 
NHGs 
7,538 
113,675 
125,735 
147,989 
167,907 
No. of 
ADS 
-
13,423 
13,766 
13,262 
14,574 
No of 
Families 
Covered 
-
2,210,033 
2,645,369 
2,923,425 
3,381,764 
Informal 
amount 
of Thrift 
Amount 
of Loan 
(in million Rs.) 
883.9 
1,634.9 
2,528.3 
5,330.1 
6,640.0 
561.4 
1,695.9 
3,925.0 
13,078.7 
15,352.0 
Velocity 
of 
Internal 
lending 
0.63 
1.04 
1.55 
2.45 
2.30 
Source: Kudumbashree, Annual Report (Various issues). 
Over the years, the number of NHGs created under the 
Kudumbashree program has raised from 7,538 in 1999-2000 to 167,907 by 
2005-06 (Table 3.6 and Appendix 3). The amount of thrift collected from 
households has increased from Rs. 884 million to Rs. 6,640 million during 
the same period - a nearly eight-fold increase. The amount of loan given to 
households has increased of a nearly 27-fold during the same period (from 
Rs. 561 million in 1999-2000 to Rs. 15,352 million in 2005-06). The 
velocity of internal lending (credit to thrift ratio) has dramatically improved 
from 0.63 in 1999-2000 to 2.3 in 2005-06 (Kudumbashree, Annual reports, 
various issues). Similarly, purpose-wise, the share of consumption which 
was as high as 98 percent in 1998 fell to 12 percent by 2004 - indicating a 
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shift towards income-generation schemes or micro-enterprises (Varma, 
200719). 
The state government has claimed this program to be a huge 
success in terms of its coverage as well as its income and social impacts 
(Government of Kerala, 2005b). Other states have evinced interests in this 
program (like Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi) as a model of poverty 
alleviation and rural development. The success of this model along with the 
Micro-Credit Summit in New York in 1997 inspired the Kerala government 
to extend the program to the entire state, initially as SHGs and later under 
the special program "Kudumbashree" in 1998. Unlike the earlier anti-
poverty programs, Kudumbashree recognizes that poverty has multiple 
dimensions and manifestations and also that the poor should exert complete 
participation in any anti-poverty program. This program won appreciation 
and award from the United Nations (We the People: 50 Communities 
Award). Kudumbashree was noted for its community-based organizational 
structure (and participation) and non-conventional indicators of poverty. 
Poverty: Concept 
One unique feature of the Kudumbashree program is the method 
used to identify the poor. In India, poverty estimates are based on 
consumption survey conducted by the National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO) every 5 years. These figures are available for the 
19
 See Varma's article at 
http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=92310. 
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1974 to 2000 period. Since the seminal work of Amartya Sen (1979, 1985, 
1987), it is increasingly recognized that poverty is a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon. Kudumbashree uses this multi-dimensional concept to gauge 
poverty, rather than just judging via a shortfall in income or consumption 
of a family. This methodology was introduced in the early 1990s under the 
pilot of the Urban Basic Services Program in Alleppey town. The Alleppey 
methodology is believed to be superior to the conventional head count ratio 
as it captures the multi-dimensional characteristics of poverty (beyond the 
simple income poverty) and leads to the identification of the most 
vulnerable families. 
Table 3.7: Nine Points Poverty Index 
Rural Urban 
1 Family with no land /less than 10 1 Families with no/limited (less 
cents of land. than 5 cents) of land. 
2 Family with no house/dilapidated 2 Family with no house/dilapidated 
house. house. 
3 Family with no access to sanitary 3 No access to safe drinking water 
latrines. (within 150 meters). 
4 No access to safe drinking water 4 No access to sanitary latrine, 
(within 300 meters). 
5 Women headed household/presence 5 Family with no stable 
of widow, divorcee/abandoned employment (less than 10 days in 
lady/unwed mother. a month). 
6 Family with no regularly employed 6 Family with women as the 
person. breadwinner and/or women who 
is widowed/divorced or family 
with unwed mother. 
7 Family who has a physically 7 Family who is physically 
challenged/mentally challenged/mentally 
challenged/chronically ill member. challenged/other disabilities 
8 Socially disadvantaged groups like 8 Socially disadvantaged groups 
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe. like Scheduled Caste/Scheduled 
Tribe. 
9 Families with an illiterate adult 9 At least a member of the family 
member. is addict to alcohol or drug.* 
j - j ^ B S — a g j g m m i m m M a g g B — _ s g g s g j j m B m m m j m m s g m ^ £ — g ^ m ! j 
* Since 2000, this criterion was replaced with "Family with no color T.V". 
Source: Government of Kerala, 2005c; Kudumbashree website. 
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To identify the poor, Kudumbashree carries out a baseline survey 
with the help of the local government. A household is considered poor if it 
possesses four or more of the nine non-monetary indicators, each reflecting 
a different kind of deprivation (Table 3.7). The combination of any four 
risk factors provides 126 possible ways of finding a poor household. In the 
case of a 'destitute family', all the risk factors or at least eight out of nine 
are to be positive. The multi-index of poverty is based on the argument that 
poverty expresses itself in multi-dimensional outcomes. The outcome 
indicators relate to the various dimensions of poverty, viz., lack of food, 
clothing, housing, health, education as well as psychosocial indicators. 
They argue that poverty is a complex set of instances of social exclusion 
that stretches out over numerous areas of individual and collective 
existence. Therefore, this results in the poor being separated from the 
generally accepted living patterns in society which make them unable to 
bridge this gap on their own. In the literature the debate regarding 
measurement of poverty has been based on resources (income) versus 
outcomes (living conditions). 
The Tamil Nadu Slum Development Board implemented this 
approach in India in identifying the slum poor and extended it to a 7-points 
index of poverty. The 9-points poverty index was formulated by UNICEF 
(Chennai) in collaboration with the CDS unit of Alleppey town, where the 
program was first started in 1993. The 9-points poverty index used in the 
Kudumbashree program is simple and well understood by the public and 
57 
can be easily implemented at the local level. Apart from its simplicity, it 
recognizes the various manifestations of deprivation and suggests possible 
corrective actions. The identification of the prevalence of risk factors is 
done through the NHGs network of Kudumbashree. Since members of a 
NHG belong to a particular geographic area, they are extremely aware 
about the prevalence of risk factors among families. 
Structure of the Kudumbashree program 
Neighborhood Groups 
Another unique feature of Kudumbashree is the community 
participation in this anti-poverty program. The organization of the 
community is based on a three-tier structure (Chart 3.1). At the grassroots 
level, the poor are organized into NHGs that can rank up to 40 women 
members from different poor families, but generally count between 10 and 
20 members. These households are usually from the same neighborhood. In 
the event of some NHGs having more than 20 households, either a new 
NHG is formed or some households are encouraged to join other NHGs. 
The poor do not form groups on their own accord; rather they are initiated 
and coordinated by outsiders (either an NGO or an elected official of the 
local self-government (at the panchayat level) and most often by 
Kudumbashree officials. Case in point, interviews revealed that many of 
the present day NHGs were found to be initially organized as SHGs (under 
the banner of private NGOs) which later converted to NHGs under 
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Kudumbashree, presumably to take advantage of the subsidy provided by 
the Kudumbashree program. 
NHGs hold regular meetings. At the beginning, NHGs have to 
democratically elect a President, Secretary and three elected officials from 
among their members. These persons perform various functions including: 
leadership, team building, maintenance of records from the meetings, 
collection of thrifts and/or payment of loans etc. Once the elections are 
settled, meetings are also used to assess the following decisions: 
• A requirement to contribute a small sum each week to the 
20 
common pot ; 
• Giving the common pot to a single member each week; 
• No written or formal contracts; all agreements are monitored and 
enforced by group members. 
The group normally meets weekly and a member suffers individual 
penalties (varying between Rs. 1 to Rs. 5) for non-attendance and late 
coming. Records of attendance, discussions and decisions are recorded by 
the group while meetings occur. Households who move out of the 
neighborhood (among other reasons, because of marriage and jobs) are 
replaced by new members. The new member has to pay the thrift of the 
departing member (in full or in installments). 
The idea of NHGs maintaining deposits with banks reduces considerably the transaction 
cost incurred by banks who maintain these deposits individually. If on an average there are 
100 NHGs/SHGs, the bank in effect is servicing on an average 2,000 customers with just 
100 accounts. Moreover banks need not incur much cost on loan appraisal and monitoring. 
Chart 3.1: Organizational Structure of Kudumbashree 
Once the NHG gets the approval of the bank, it is given a loan 
which can theoretically go up to eight times the thrift mobilized by the 
group. From our field experience, we found the loan to be about two to 
three times the thrift which the group is able to mobilize. We also found 
that banks lend at a rate of interest of 8 to 10 percent with a maturity of 3 
years. However, the NHGs lend to their members adding a spread of 1.5 to 
2 percent to their cost of funds from banks. The profits arising out of such 
mark-up lending is shared by members of the NHGs21. Bank lending to 
NHGs/SHGs are classified as priority sector lending and qualify for 
refinance from NABARD. 
21
 Kudumbashree program has been criticized for charging a mark-up (profiteering). 
However, such profits are shared among members. Hence, the argument that it is like any 
other financial intermediary does not hold good. 
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To be eligible for loan and subsidy support from Kudumbashree, 
each member of NHG has to undergo training in her prospective area of 
operation. The cost of training is borne by Kudumbashree. The group also 
lends from the resources (loans) from banks to its members and the interest 
rates are normally higher (10 to 60 percent). Loans are taken from banks in 
the group's name but the assets bought (like agricultural animals) are 
shared individually and each member conducts his or her business 
individually. There are cases of loans serving a group activity as well, but 
they are a minority. 
In case a member defaults, she is often given some grace period to 
repay. The peer-pressure built by other group members is often so much 
that the defaulting member is often forced to borrow from other sources 
(like chit funds, moneylenders, other micro-credit units, etc.) to repay for 
the loan taken from the group. 
The Kudumbashree program has a subsidy element which is back-
loaded in the repayment schedule in the sense that members of NHGs 
receive the subsidy only after the full repayment of bank loans sans the 
subsidy amount. This is presumably to prevent willful defaults at the initial 
stage. The subsidy is subject to a ceiling of Rs. 100,000 with a ceiling of 
Rs. 10,000 per person for each family. In the event of default of loan by the 
group (which could be triggered by default of one or more of members), 
the group stand to lose the subsidy. This induces the non-defaulting 
members of the group to make-up for the defaults of individual members. 
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The eligibility criteria for enjoying subsidy are that NHGs should have 
undertaken the relevant training provided by Kudumbashree/government. 
In fact, the subsidy variable is very crucial in the dynamics of the 
repayment record as it will be discussed in the following chapters. SHGs 
linked with banks do not enjoy this facility (subsidy). 
Area Development Society and Community Development Society 
Chart 3.2: Organizational Structure of NHG/ADS/CDS Under 
Kudumbashree Program 
20 - 40 BPL families 
Ward-level Advisory 
committee presided 
over by municipal 
ward councilors 
CDS advisory 
committee presided 
over by municipal 
chairman with 
municipal 
commissioner as a co-
governor 
Supporting 
organizations such as 
NABARD, Banks, etc. 
NHG 
NHG Committee of selected 
members 
ADS general body 
Elected ADS governing body 
CDS general body 
Elected CDS governing body 
Government, 
District administrations 
Neighborhood 
level 
Ward level 
Town level 
The Area Development Society (ADS) is the second tier of the 
Kudumbashree program structure. It is formed by federating between 10 
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and 15 NHGs and it works at the ward level (Chart 3.2). Each ADS has a 
general body and a governing body. The general body consists of the 
following elected positions: President/Chairperson, a Secretary and three 
sectoral volunteers (infrastructure, health and income generation). All 
elected persons emanates from the federated NHGs. ADS' mandate is to 
integrate NHG micro-plans at the ward level. The ADS works in close 
coordination with the elected ward councilors whom preside over the ward 
level advisory committee. 
The top structure is the CDS22, which is a federation of the ADS. 
Like the ADS, the CDS also has a general and governing body. In CDS 
general body, apart from the governing body members (which members are 
emanating from ADS), representatives of resource persons and various 
program implementation officers are included. At the rural level, the 
President of the village administration is the patron; the Chairperson of the 
Standing Committee (Welfare) and the women members of the Block 
panchayat are ex-officio members of the CDS. In its urban counterpart, the 
Mayor is the patron. The three-tier structure of CDS is intended to facilitate 
a "bottom-up" approach in poverty eradication and to ensure community 
participation in the development process. Thus the decision-makers in this 
program are the poor themselves rather than bureaucrats or politicians. 
Secondly, CDS has strong interactions with panchayat officials and elected 
representatives, thereby gaining political support and ensuring legitimacy 
for their existence. Thirdly, this process ensures female empowerment and 
22
 The CDS is formed as a registered society under the Charitable Society Act. 
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thereby increases the prospects of substantial social capital in the 
development process. 
NHG members prepare a 'micro-plan' for their area based on their 
needs (Chart 3.3). The ADS governing committee receives all the NHG 
micro-plans, integrate them and prepare 'mini-plans'. The mini-plans are 
given to the village/town CDS which integrate them into 'CDS 
Village/Town Action plans'. The CDS plans formed the anti-poverty sub-
plan of the village/municipality/town. At the neighborhood level, the CDS 
is responsible for motivating NHG members and facilitating 
implementation of the programs. It brings all departments and agencies 
under one umbrella so that all activities and programs aimed at benefiting 
the community as a whole or as individual households under NHGs could 
be planned and implemented in an integrated fashion. 
Chart 3.3: Kudumbashree and Local Plans 
NHG: NHGC members with 
NHG prepare micro-plans 
' 
\ 
\ 
' 
ADS: All micro-plans from 
NHGs consolidated as mini-
plans 
CDS: Mini-plans 
consolidated a s action plan 
/ 
/ 
Participation in 
grama sabhas 
Empowerment 
i 
LGB: Action plan forms 
the antipoverty sub-pla in 
. 
Convergence 
Note: NHG = Neighborhood Group; NHGC = Neighborhood Group Committee; ADS = 
Area Development Society; CDS = Committee Development Society; LGB = Local 
Governing Bodies. 
Source: Kadiyala, 2004. 
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Section 3.3 Conclusion 
The Indian model of microfinance is essentially based on the SHG-
Bank linkage model. NABARD is the apex institution responsible to 
oversight rural credit and rural development. It provides refinance to banks 
that lend money to the SHGs. The SHG-Bank linkage approach is found to 
be an effective instrument by which poor people (informal sector) can 
access credit from the formal sector without collateral security and 
simultaneously improve their thrift habits. It has also helped banks to 
improve their profitability as the repayment rates under this type of lending 
are fairly high and transactions costs relatively low as the bulk of the 
intermediation work is done by NHGs. Apart from the NABARD 
patronized SHG-Bank linkage model, it exists a parallel system of 
microfinance institutions promoted by non-state (private) agencies. 
However, their outreach is not very significant. 
The Kudumbashree program as developed by the government of 
Kerala is unique in many features. First, it has its spotlight on women and 
poverty. Second, the method used to identify the poor has the quality of 
being practical and also reflects the multidimensional aspects of poverty. 
Thirdly, the back-loaded subsidy element is supposed to spur repayment 
and it is interesting to examine the moral hazard issues associated with it. 
Finally, the bottom-up structure involves the poor in the decision-making 
of the organization. 
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Kudumbashree is seen as a success story in the anti-poverty 
program in India and many state governments contemplates the idea of 
setting up this model of poverty alleviation. There are some initial attempts 
to analyze the Kudumbashree program (Government of Kerala, 2005b; Pat, 
2005; Kadiyala, 2004), but there are no serious attempts to study the impact 
on its members (be it economically or socially) or analyze the reason for its 
success. The present study is an attempt in this regard. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATABASE AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the database and the methodology of the 
study. It also provides a brief analysis of broad trends appearing in the 
sample data using broad descriptive statistics. 
Section 4.1: Database 
The study is based on both (a) secondary data (provided by the 
Kudumbashree organization) and (b) primary data based on a survey of 
NHGs in two panchayats. 
(a) Secondary Data 
The economic data about the two panchayats (Thazhava and 
Kumily in the Kollam and Idukki districts respectively) were provided by 
the panchayat government as well as by the Kudumbashree organization. 
Concerning the information on households under NHGs, the 
Kudumbashree organization maintains household level information at the 
ward, panchayat and at district levels. These data provide a host of 
information about the socio-economic characteristics - like age, 
education, level of poverty, size of the project, etc. - of the households 
under the program. Besides, Kudumbashree also conducts periodic 
(normally annual) evaluations (called bench-mark surveys) about changes 
in the socio-economic characteristics of these households. These data 
provided the initial database for our primary investigation. 
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(b) Primary Data 
A survey of NHGs under the Kudumbashree program was done in 
two different panchayats of Kerala in June 2006. The basic focus of the 
survey is the NHG. As said in the previous section, the basic data on NHGs 
under the Kudumbashree program at the panchayat level is maintained by 
the Kudumbashree organization. These data formed the base for our initial 
investigation. First, we stratified all NHGs under the different wards in a 
panchayat into those undertaking micro-enterprises and those undertaking 
other activities. Then, a 10 percent sample was selected from NHGs having 
micro-enterprises using a simple random number table. Thus, we covered 
around 30 NHGs and given the fact that each NHG could potentially have 
up to 20 members, we are looking at a picture of around 600 households. 
Building on this, we set up a structure questionnaire. While designing the 
questionnaire, we consulted the focus groups (Kudumbashree officials, 
NHGs, banks etc). NHGs were interviewed in group and we also 
interviewed households individually so that the gathered information could 
be cross-validated. To collect data, we used the face-to-face interview 
method with NHGs as a whole ad some members separately. The focus of 
the investigation is the dynamics of repayment rates and the social impact 
of the program. In order to gauge their performance, we supplemented the 
data wherever possible from the surveys conducted by the Kudumbashree 
district offices. For the exercise, we chose two panchayats: Thazhava in the 
Kollam district and Kumily in the Idukki district (show by arrows in Chart 
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4.1). We chose these panchayats for the study as they (NHGs) had a fairly 
good record of existence ( 2 - 4 years) and because of the fact that they are 
in the south and central parts of Kerala which reflects the geographical 
diversity of the state. We did not choose any NHG from the northern part 
of Kerala as they were relatively new (of less than two years of existence). 
Table 4.1: Basic Parameters of the Sample 
SI Parameters Thazhava Kumily 
no. (Kollam) (Idukki) 
1 Total Area (Sq. Kms.) 2,358 5105.22 
2 Total Population 
Male 
Female 
Sex Ratio 
3 Density of population per square kilometers 1,632 42 
4 Literacy rate 
Male 
Female 
5 Total Number of Families 
No of BPL Families 
% of BPL Families 
6 (a)No of families covered under Kudumbashree 
(b) % coverage 
7 Amount of thrift (in million Rupees) 
8 Amount of Loan (in million Rupees.) 
9 Velocity of internal lending 
Source: Kudumbashree and Lead Banks of these districts. 
38,488 
18,347 
20,141 
1097 
34,558 
17,377 
17,181 
988 
93.8 
85.9 
9,005 
5,501 
61 
5,515 
81 
119.9 
350.5 
2.92 
79.05 
71.07 
8060 
4,251 
52 
6,820 
84 
171.1 
379.2 
2.22 
In India, a bank is assigned the status of lead bank in a district. The bank designated as 
the lead bank has the task of assuming leadership role rural lending programs in the 
district (called as Lead Bank program). 
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Chart 4.1: Districts Where the Study Was Undertaken 
Lakshadweep Sea TAMILNADO 
Source: Tourist Map of Kerala, 2007 
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The basic parameters of the panchayats are given in Table 4.1. In 
Thazhava panchayat in Kollam district, the population density is quite high. 
Both panchayats are predominantly rural areas and predominantly 
agriculture-based. Kumily panchayat is also rural, but a high range area 
with low density of population. Like the general pattern in Kerala, The 
70 
Thazhava panchayat has a sex ratio that is favorable to women, while in the 
Kumily panchayat, the sex ratio is favorable to males. These panchayats 
also have a fairly high literacy rate with female literacy slightly lower than 
that of men. Kumily panchayat is slightly different from the Thazhava 
panchayat in the sense that it is an economy dominated by cash crops like 
rubber, cardamom, tea, etc. These sectors have witnessed high level of 
economic tensions: a consequence of the closure of many tea plantations. 
The number of families classified as below the poverty line (BPL) 
is also quite high (ranging from 40 to 61 percent) as compared with the 
rural poverty rate of 9.4 percent in 1999-2000. An interesting feature of 
the Kudumbashree program in these two panchayats is the high coverage 
(81 to 84 percent) of families below the poverty line (BPL) under the 
Kudumbashree program. 
Similarly, the amount of thrift (savings) and loans disbursed 
(through the NHG-Bank linkage program) is also high in the Thazhava 
panchayat as compared with the Kumily panchayat. The velocity of 
internal lending which is a measure of the success of the NHG-Bank 
linkage program is also high in Thazhava (2.9) as compared with Kumily 
(2.2) 
Section 4.2: Methodology 
The data is analyzed using descriptive statistics - measures of 
central tendency and measures of dispersion (like range, standard 
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deviation, variance, etc.). In order to facilitate a more meaningful analysis, 
we supplemented the descriptive statistics with charts (bar diagrams, pie 
charts, etc.). We also used correlation/regression analysis. In this process, 
we converted many qualitative variables (like sex, education, sector of 
activity, etc.) into dummy variables. 
Section 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample: Financial Characteristics 
of Micro-enterprises 
An initial analysis of the size of the capital used by NHGs to 
develop their micro-enterprises reveals interesting characteristics. The 
median capital of micro-enterprises was Rs. 100,000 (Table 4.2). The 
minimum capital size was Rs. 75,000 and maximum Rs. 300,000. Most of 
the micro-enterprises (modal value) had a capital size of Rs. 75,000. The 
capital size of the projects varied substantially (range Rs. 225,000) and the 
standard deviation was around Rs. 66,888. 
Table: 4.2: Basic Descriptive Statistics of the Sampled NHGs Under 
the Kudumbashree Program 
Statistics 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Range 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Capital 
75,000 
300,000 
225,000 
136,330 
100,000 
75,000 
66,888 
-0.98 
0.50 
Fixed 
capital 
31,000 
100,000 
69,000 
63,946 
62,000 
62,000 
16,145 
1.14 
0.62 
Working 
Capital 
10,000 
100,000 
90,000 
32,918 
12,000 
12,000 
34,419 
0.06 
1.33 
(in Rupees) 
Household 
Income 
10,8000 
45,000 
34,2000 
20,605 
18,000 
16,000 
8,004 
1.97 
1.35 
Net 
Income 
6,000 
48,000 
42,000 
13,986 
10,000 
10,000 
10,181 
6.95 
2.72 
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The bulk of the capital was used as fixed capital (the median was 
Rs. 62,000) as compared to working capital (the median was Rs. 12,000), 
indicating that capital was the scare resource. The range of fixed capital 
was also higher (Rs. 69,000); in fact, some enterprises required as low as 
Rs. 31,000 and some as high as Rs. 100,000. Similarly, the range of 
working capital was also higher (Rs. 90,000); some enterprises required 
working capital as low as Rs. 10,000 and some as high as Rs. 45,000. The 
most common size (modal value) of fixed capital and working capital was 
Rs. 62,000 and Rs. 12,000 respectively. Generally the median fixed capital 
used was nearly 5.2 times that of working capital. 
The median annual gross household income of a household was 
Rs. 18,000. However, it varied between Rs. 10,800 (minimum) to Rs. 
45,000 (maximum) in the sample households. Most of the households 
(mode) had a median income of Rs. 18,000. As regards annual net income, 
the median income of average households is Rs. 10,000. It varied between 
Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 48,000 among households. 
The above analysis clearly shows the heterogeneous nature of the 
sample. The median size of the capital of Kudumbashree micro-enterprises 
was Rs. 100,000 with fixed capital expenditure nearly 5.2 times that of 
working capital. The median annual gross household income of 
households in the Kudumbashree program was Rs. 20,605 with a net 
income of Rs. 13,000 which is nearly 63 percent of gross household 
income. 
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CHAPTER V 
DYNAMICS OF REPAYMENT RATES OF THE 
MICRO-ENTERPRISE PROGRAM OF 
KUDUMBASHREE 
The impact of micro-credit has been viewed from different 
perspectives. Traditionally, it has been studied from the point of view of 
the lender, focusing on factors determining the high repayment rates 
(Khandker, Khalily and Khan, 1995, Khalily et al., 2002). In Bangladesh 
where the Grameen Bank was initially studied, most of the studies have 
evaluated the impact at the household level (Khandker, 1988; Zohir et al., 
2001; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Mustafa et al., 1996; Husain, 1998). It is 
now well known that micro-credit institutions through innovative contracts 
worldwide have generated high repayment rates. This has brought into 
focus the fact that lending to the poor is also profit making and a 
sustainable proposition for banks (Cull, Demigiic-Kunt and Murdoch, 
2006). Like microfinance programs worldwide, Kudumbashree has been 
hailed as a success because of its high repayment rates (94.5 percent). The 
main aim of this chapter is to understand the dynamics of this high 
repayment rate. 
This chapter is organized as follows: First we scan the theoretical 
developments in the field of group-lending. Then, we empirically examine 
the dynamics of repayment rates of the micro-enterprise program of 
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Kudumbashree based on the survey of members of NHGs in two 
panchayats in Kerala: Thazhava and Kumily. The third section is devoted 
to an econometric investigation of the determinants of the repayment rate. 
The last section will summarize the conclusions of this chapter. 
To understand the dynamics of repayment rate under the 
Kudumbashree program, we examine its relationship with some of the 
commonly known economic and social parameters, viz.: (i) size of the 
project, (ii) sector category, (iii) land ownership, (iv) education, (v) the 
level of poverty, and (vi) subsidies and other positive incentives. 
Section 5.1: Review of Literature - A Brief Review 
In the theoretical literature, the asymmetric information framework 
provides the standard explanation of why poor are excluded from credit 
market: poor lack collateral and other visible assets and therefore are 
difficult to monitor which cause them to be more credit rationed or credit 
denied. Recent theoretical works have provided explanation of how such 
information asymmetries could be avoided in credit markets24. One such 
explanation is the micro-lending based on 'group lending'. We review 
below some of the theoretical explanations for the success of group 
lending. 
Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990), and Becker (1991) provide 
explanations based on 'peer monitoring'. Using results from contract 
24
 For a complete review of literature, see the following efforts which are devoted to this 
subject: Murdoch (1999), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Armendariz de Aghion and 
Murdoch (2005). 
75 
theory, they argue that since loans are given to a 'group' rather than to an 
'individual' (as in the traditional lending arrangement), group members 
have an incentive to monitor their peers. Since group members have better 
information compared to lenders, peer monitoring would be relatively 
cheaper compared to bank monitoring, leading to greater monitoring and 
greater rates of repayment. 
Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994), Besley and Coate (1995), 
Conning (1996), Madajewicz (1998), Stiglitz (1990), Armendariz de 
Aghion (1999) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) also argue that compared 
to other explanations, arguments based on peer monitoring are more 
successful in explaining the success of group lending schemes. They 
illustrate how imposing joint liability on borrowers can alleviate adverse 
and more hazard problems. However, the variables they emphasize in 
order to demonstrate peer monitoring are slightly different. 
Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Tassel (1999) argue that group lending 
could lead to homogenous group formation. They affirm that joint liability 
and self-selection in credit could lead to positive assertive matching so 
that borrowers of the same type club together. Safe borrowers will form 
credit cooperatives and risky borrowers will be left aside. 
Besley and Coate (1995) analyze a strategic repayment game with 
joint liability and demonstrate that successful group members may have an 
incentive to repay the loans of the less successful ones. They also 
highlight the effects of social collateral in enforcing prompt repayment. 
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Another explanation for the success of group lending is the 
'contingent renewal explanation'. Contingent renewal of loans is one kind 
of positive incentive to repay. It refers to the feature that in case of default 
by a group, no member of this group will receive future loans. In case of 
prompt repayment, there is repeat lending. As a result, the probability of 
moral hazard is reduced. This is achieved by introducing joint-liability 
contracts which transfers the risk from the lender to the borrower. Studies 
by Besley and Coate (1995), Khandker, Khalily and Khan (1995), Ray 
(1999) and Rai and Sjostrom (2004) emphasize the 'domino effect' of the 
group being excluded from future loans (in the case of a member 
defaulting on loan) as a potential incentive mechanism to enforce 
repayment of the group. The contingent renewal implies that the selection 
of borrowers is credit history dependent. 
In recent times, attempts have been made to answer the question 
whether group lending is a complete financial tool or whether there are 
possible alternatives or improvements to develop. Some of the new 
innovative ideas include smaller but more frequent repayment installments 
and replacing the joint-liability clause with requirement of public 
repayment25. 
The new microfinance literature highlights the gender by 
emphasizing the role of women in the microfinance revolution. 
Traditionally women have less access to credit. However, they are more 
likely to repay their debts than men. Women are more concerned with 
!5
 For a review of recent ideas, see Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch (2005), chapter 5. 
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household improvement, children's education and their health than are the 
male family members. Some of the new lending schemes like higher loan 
amounts over time and easy installments are important tools to attract 
female borrowers. 
Section 5.2: Repayment Rate and its Determinants 
Repayment Rate and Project Size 
The average capital size of the projects in the sample under 
Kudumbashree program comes to Rs. 136,330 with a standard deviation of 
Rs. 66,888. The size of capital of the projects in the sample varied 
between Rs. 75,000 and Rs. 300,000: 92 percent of capital of micro-
enterprises came from external sources and 7 percent from internal source. 
Among the external sources, bank borrowing accounted for 52 percent and 
the remaining came as subsidies/matching funds from local bodies. 
On an average, micro-enterprises in the sample under 
Kudumbashree program generated a net income of Rs. 13,986, which 
represents an 11.5 percent return on capital. Considering that the cost of 
the group's loan stands at 10 percent, NHGs appear to be able to create 
positive returns from their borrowings (micro-loans). In this endeavour, 
one has to recognize that these figures (net income) relates only to 
marketable surplus and does not include self-consumption of NHG 
households. Hence, these figures (rate of return on capital) could be 
substantially higher. 
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An analysis of the relationship between project (capital) size and 
the repayment rate reveals interesting results. Projects (micro-enterprises) 
with capital of less than Rs. 100,000 in capital had a 100 percent 
repayment rate. Projects that needed Rs. 100,000 or more in capital had a 
relatively lower repayment rate (90 percent) (see Table 5.1). Thus the 
repayment rate seems to be inversely related to project capital size: the 
higher the size of capital, the lower is the repayment rate. Projects 
requiring less capital seem to be performing well thereby generating 
higher repayment rate. 
Table 5.1: Distribution of NHGs According to the Capital Size of their 
Project 
Capital Size (in 
Rs.) 
Less than 100,000 
100,000 and more 
Repayment rate 
(in %) 
100.0 
90.0 
NHGs 
Number 
14 
16 
Percent 
46.7 
53.3 
Source: Sample Survey 
Repayment Rate: Sector-wise Performances 
An analysis of the distribution of activities undertaken by 
households under NHGs under the Kudumbashree program reveals that 67 
percent of the projects (micro-enterprises) were agricultural, 23 percent 
were industry related activities and 10 percent were related to the service 
sector (see Table 5.2 and Chart 5.1). In the sample, the bulk of the 
agricultural activities relate to animal husbandry: goat rearing, cow rearing 
and rabbit rearing. Most of the manufacturing activities relate to food 
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processing and service sector activities relate mostly to tutoring, music 
and tailoring. 
Chart 5.1: Repayment Rate of NHGs According to their 
Activities 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
Agricultural sector Industrial sector 
Sector 
Service sector 
Source: Sample Survey 
Table 5.2: Distribution of NHGs: Sector-Wise 
Sector 
Agriculture sector 
Goat Rearing 
Rabbit Rearing 
Cow Rearing 
Industrial sector 
Fish net 
manufacturer 
Food Processing 
Confectionary 
Handicraft 
Candle making 
Service sector 
Music 
Tutoring 
Tailoring 
No of NHGs 
20 
17 
1 
2 
7 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
Total 
67.0 
57.0 
3.0 
7.0 
23.0 
3.0 
7.0 
3.0 
7.0 
3.0 
10 
3.3 
3.3 
3.3 
Percent to 
Sector total 
100.0 
85.0 
5.0 
10.0 
100.0 
14.0 
29.0 
14.0 
29.0 
14.0 
100.0 
33.3 
33.3 
33.3 
Source: Sample Survey 
80 
Table 5.3: Correlation Matrix Among Principal Variables 
RR 
CP 
Sector 
Education 
PS 
LO 
RR 
1 
-0.556* 
0.841* 
-0.076 
-0.034 
-0.649* 
CP 
1 
0.661* 
-0.520* 
0.018 
0.468* 
Sector 
1 
-0.100 
-0.098 
0.707* 
Education 
1 
-0.049 
0.000 
PS 
1 
0.138 
LO 
1 
Notes: RR stands for Repayment Rate, CP for Capital of the Project, PS for Poverty 
Score and LO for Land Ownership. 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
A correlation analysis between the repayment rate and the sector 
categories shows a high correlation of 0.72 and is statistically significant 
at the one percent level26 (Table 5.3). This implies that repayment rates are 
closely linked to the type of activity performed by NHGs. Micro-
enterprises in the agricultural sector have a repayment rate of 100 percent 
while activities related to the industry and service sectors have a relatively 
low repayment rate of 83.6 percent and 83.3 percent respectively (see 
Table 5.4). The higher repayment rate among agricultural micro-
enterprises brings into focus the role of 'marketing' in the whole process. 
Agricultural products are generally tradable locally as they have ready 
market in rural communities. On the other hand, non-agricultural products 
are not readily tradable or marketable. They face competition from 
existing organized retail outlets. Therefore, for non-agricultural activities, 
groups' repayment record is handicapped by marketing constrains. In 
other words, micro-enterprises do sometimes create considerable 'non-
tradables'. To make profits from these non-tradable goods or services is 
For the empirical exercise, we converted the economic activities into a binary variable: 
0 is for agriculture sector related activities and 1 for other non-agricultural sectors. 
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the major challenge faced by microfinance enterprises. Households under 
NHGs are not able to market their products despite the good quality of 
their products (than competitive products). 
Table 5.4: Repayment Rate According to the Economic Sector of the 
Undertaken Activity 
Sector Repayment rate (in %) 
Primary (Agricultural) sector 100.0 
Secondary (Industrial) sector 83.6 
Tertiary (Service) sector 83.3 
Source: Sample Survey 
Repayment Rate and Land Ownership 
In the literature on economic development, land ownership was 
considered as a significant variable in the development process. That is 
why in many developing countries, land reforms have been on the top of 
reforms and development agendas. The availability and ownership of land, 
which is a significant variable in the rural setting, enables the poor to use 
these assets (labor power) for their livelihood. In the absence of these 
assets, households are constrained in their activities (micro-enterprises). 
The state of Kerala had implemented in 1957 comprehensive land reforms 
and is often cited as a success story (Krishnaji, 1979, 2007; Herring, 1983; 
Raj and Tharakan, 1983). The land reforms implemented in the State (i) 
abolished tenancy, (ii) provided hutment land to agricultural laborers and 
(iii) imposed land ceiling. 
The relationship between the repayment rate and land ownership is 
one of the interesting aspects in microfinance. It is interesting to examine 
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whether poor households with land ownership are able to conduct micro-
enterprises more effectively and thereby generate higher repayment rate. It 
must be recognized that the magnitude of land ownership among poor 
NHGs is very small (less than 15 cents27). 
Table 5.5: Relationship Between Repayment Rate and Land 
Ownership 
Repayment 
rate (in %) 
NHGs Percent to total 
No. % 
Households 
possessing land 
Of which: 
Agricultural 
Industrial 
Service 
Households not 
possessing land 
Of which: 
Agricultural 
Industrial 
Service 
97.5 
100 
82.5 
87.5 
82.5 
-
85 
70 
24 
20 
2 
2 
6 
0 
5 
1 
100.0 
83.3 
8.3 
8.3 
100.0 
0 
83.3 
16.7 
80.0 
66.7 
6.7 
6.7 
20.0 
0.0 
16.7 
3.3 
Source: Sample Survey 
Chart 5.2: Distribution of NHGs According to their Land Ownership 
and their Economic Sector 
a) Distribution of NHGs Possessing Land According to their 
Activity 
83.3% 
8.3% 8.3% 
B Agricultural Sector 
D Industrial Sector 
• Service Sector 
100 cents is equal to one acre. 
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b) Distribution of NHGs Possessing Land According to their 
Activity 
83.3% 
0% 16.7% 
a Agricultural Sector 
D Industrial Sector 
• Service Sector 
Source: Sample Survey 
Eighty percent of households under NHGs had land ownership and 
their repayment record is relatively high (98 percent) (Table 5.5 and Chart 
5.2). NHGs without land (no household within the NHG possessed land) 
accounted for 20 percent of all NHGs and had a relatively low repayment 
record and were mostly involved with non-agricultural activities. Among 
NHGs that possessed land, 83 percent were involved in agricultural 
activities. The remaining NHGs (17 percent) were divided equally 
between the industrial and service sector. Land ownership seems to 
influence the repayment record of households. 
Repayment Rate and Education 
The literature on the relationship between education and economic 
development especially those from the endogenous growth literature show 
a positive relationship between education and economic growth. 
Extending this literature to microfinance, one would expect a strong 
positive correlation between education levels and repayment rate: higher 
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the education, higher will be the repayment rate. In our empirical 
investigation, we found a negative and statistically insignificant 
correlation between education levels and repayment rate (Table 5.6). It 
must be recognized that Kerala has universal literacy and the poor are also 
literate. However, most of the micro-enterprises were agricultural. For 
these kinds of activities, the pool of knowledge comes from their extended 
family and social networks (see Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6: Distribution of NHGs According to their Education Level 
Educational level 
Below Standard VIII 
Standard VHI to XII 
College Degree 
Repayment 
rate (in %) 
95.5 
95.3 
70.0 
Number 
10 
19 
1 
NHGs 
% to total 
33.3 
63.3 
3.3 
Source: Sample Survey 
Repayment Rate and Poverty 
The Kudumbashree program considers households between four 
and five to be moderately poor while households having a score of six or 
higher were considered severely poor. The average poverty score of 
households in the sample was five. An analysis of the repayment record 
based on poverty score reveals interesting results. The severe poor (with 
poverty score of six and above) had a comparatively better repayment rate 
(94.1 percent) as compared with the moderate poor (90.5 percent) (Table 
5.7). 
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Table 5.7: Distribution of Households Under NHGs According to 
their Poverty Score 
Poverty Score 
4 - 5 
6 and above 
Repayment 
rate 
90.5 
94.1 
Number 
19 
11 
NHGs 
% to total 
63.3 
36.7 
Source: Sample Survey 
Pre-Repayment of the Loan 
An analysis of the repayment record of borrowers under the 
Kudumbashree program in the sample reveal that about 30 percent of 
households under NHGs had pre-repayment, i.e. they were ahead of their 
repayment schedules. It is important to analyze the reasons for this pre-
repayment. Although this is an intriguing financial behavior, it can easily 
be explained with the two positives incentives provided by 
Kudumbashree: (a) to secure future loans - the contingent renewal 
explanation and (b) pre-repayment enables the borrowing households to 
secure subsidies earlier . 
The promise of securing a higher future loan acts as a powerful 
incentive to fully repay their loan. As evident from Table 3.6 in chapter 3, 
the internal velocity of households' credit under Kudumbashree program 
was more than 2. This implies that they are able to secure loans more than 
their thrift from banks. In fact, some of the households in the sample were 
at their second loan from banks. 
It must be noted that subsidies are treated in the installment of the loan. 
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The Subsidy and the Repayment Rate 
One of the unique features of Kudumbashree microfinance 
program is the explicit subsidy that this program provides to its 
borrowers29. Funding for the explicit subsidy comes from rural 
development program of the central/state governments. The subsidy can 
reach a maximum of Rs. 100,000 for a single NHG and Rs. 10,000 for one 
household. It means that a maximum of 10 households in an NHG can 
avail of the subsidy. It is back loaded in the sense that it will be eligible to 
the borrowers after that they repay all installments of their loan. 
Presumably, explicit subsidy is back-end loaded to prevent defaults at the 
early stage. In fact, this becomes a powerful incentive to repay the loan 
and even initiate pre-repayment. 
To be eligible for the subsidy, members of NHGs should undergo 
the training in their respective skills which is provided by the 
Kudumbashree organization. Training programs are up to a maximum of 
seven days. They are supposed to provide the technical and commercial 
knowledge for conducting micro-enterprises in their respective field. 
Training programs are often conducted in areas that are far from 
It is important to describe the different type of subsidies within the Kudumbashree 
program. There are implicit and explicit subsidies. Implicit subsidies are the one that helps 
the program to operate as they provide the balance between the financial needs of the 
program and what the program generates with its activities. Kudumbashree being a 
governmental program, implicit subsidies are use to pay and train the staff, supply offices, 
etc. Explicit subsidies are the ones which will be given to borrowers in the form of money. 
For more information, Murdoch (1999) makes a good differentiation between the two 
types of subsidies. 
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communities in which NHGs live and therefore all members of NHGs 
would not be able to avail of the subsidy. 
The availability of subsidy acts as an incentive mechanism to 
repay. NHGs showed enthusiasm to repay their loan in the fastest mode in 
order to internalize the subsidy. Since it is back-loaded, households can 
access it only by prompt repayment. Many present day NHGs were found 
to be initially organized as SHGs (under the facilitation of private NGOs) 
but later on converted into NHGs under Kudumbashree program, 
presumably to take advantage of the availability of the 'subsidy' which the 
Kudumbashree program offers. 
Competitive Microfinance 
The issue of competitive microfinance is widely discussed in the 
literature and is of recent origin (Besley and Coate, 1995; Marquez, 2002; 
Mcintosh, Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005, Mcintosh & Wydick, 2005). 
Competitive microfinance occurs when multiple lenders exist and they are 
overlapping in their geographical area. In such a situation many borrowers 
may be taking loans from several lenders simultaneously or 'double 
dipping'. Double dipping is meant to smoothen the timing of the 
repayment of loans and to maintain cash flow. In the presence of double 
dipping, the ability of the lenders to use dynamic incentives to secure 
repayment is limited (Mcintosh, Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005, Mcintosh & 
Wydick, 2005). 
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In our sample, NHGs members are often found to be members of 
other microfinance programs as well. In fact, 50 percent of households 
were found to also be members of other microfinance entities that are 
competing on the same geographical area30. Apart from other 
microfinance entities, many households were found to be borrowing from 
other non-bank entities that have higher interest rates (money lenders, chit 
funds, etc.) to repay their loans. This cross borrowing situation could lead 
to a high repayment of their borrowings with the Kudumbashree program. 
However, by availing cross financing, the financial indebtedness only 
worsens. The fact that many microfinance programs (especially 
agricultural based) generate surplus in net income underscores the utility 
of the program despite of some borrowers availing of cross financing and 
indulging in double dipping. 
Section 5.3: Econometric Analysis 
In this section, we empirically examine the determinants of the 
repayment rate (RR) based on the variables discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs. In this endeavor, we hypothesized an equation of the 
following form: 
Yi~aa + a\X\ + 0,2X2 +& 
Yi = Repayment rate of each NHG 
Xi= Economic sector dummy variable (1 for agriculture and 0 for 
others). 
' Kudumbashree evolves in an environment where several microfinance programs are 
competing against each other. This competition situation is normally one that lowers the 
repayment rate as it is suspected to raise the level of indebtedness of the borrowers 
(Wright and Rippey (2003), Vogelgesang (2001) and Mcintosh and Wydick (2005). 
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X2= Poverty score dummy variable (1 for poverty score of above 
5 and 0 for others) and a is the error term with usual properties. 
The above equation was estimated using ordinary least squares and 
the results are reported in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.8: Correlation Matrix of the Determinants of the Repayment 
Rate 
Sector 
CP 
LO 
PS 
Education 
Sector 
1 
-0.574 
-0.616 
-0.435 
-0.564 
CP 
1 
0.789 
0.200 
-0.259 
LO 
1 
0.337 
-0.177 
PS 
1 
-0.367 
Education 
1 
Notes: CP stands for Capital of the Project, LO for Land Ownership and PS for Poverty 
Score. 
Table 5.9: Determinants of Repayment Rate (Yi): Kudumbashree 
Sample - Linear Form 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
(Standard error) 
Constant 
Economic Sector (X i) 
Poverty Score (X i) 
Diagnostics 
R Square 
Durbin-Watson (D.W) Statistic 
SEE/Mean (%) 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
We started the econometric investigation with independent 
variables like 'economic sector', 'capital size', 'land ownership', 
'education' and 'poverty score'. The initial regression results showed that 
variables like economic sector, capital size and land ownership are highly 
correlated, indicating the existence of multi-collinearity (see Table 5.8). In 
84.17* 
(1.73) 
16.72* 
(2.01) 
-2.24 
(1.96) 
0.72 
2.00 
5.4 
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order to avoid the problem of multi-collinearity, we undertook an analysis 
of correlation between the variables and the one with severe correlation 
with economic sector dummy (which are capital size (CP) and land 
ownership (LO) were dropped). This parsimonious model had only two 
independent variables: economic sector (ES) and poverty score (PS). The 
discarded variables (capital size and land ownership) were also 
statistically insignificant. The results of the parsimonious model are given 
in Table 5.9. As evident from the ordinary least square results, only the 
economic sector variable was statistically significant (at the 1 percent 
level). The poverty score variable was statistically not significant. The 
equation had a fairly high R2 (0.72) indicating that nearly 72 percent of the 
variation in dependent variable (repayment rate) is explained by the 
independent variables in the model. The model was also devoid of 
autocorrelation problem as evident from Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.0. 
Section 5.4: Conclusion 
This chapter examines the proximate determinants of repayment 
rate among households in the Kudumbashree program in Kerala, India. 
Repayment rate were found to be inversely related to capital size: micro-
enterprises with capital size of less than Rs. 100,000 were found to have a 
higher repayment rate (100 percent) as compared with micro-enterprise 
projects with larger capital size (Rs. 100,000 or more). 
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Micro-enterprises do create considerable non-tradables (output 
which cannot be marketed). This would have implication for repayment 
rate. Micro-enterprises which are agriculture based have high repayment 
record as opposed to non-agricultural micro-enterprises. Non-agricultural 
micro-enterprises have substantial marketing problems which lead to 
default, non-repayment or low repayment of loans. 
It was also found that households with land ownership have higher 
repayment record. The conduct of most of the agricultural activities 
involved land ownership. Lack of land ownership could act as a constraint 
on the conduct of micro-enterprises. Although the extent of land 
ownership is very small (around 10 cents of land), it provides an 
endowment to conduct micro-enterprises. 
Most of the households (around 50 percent) were found to have 
multiple memberships in other micro-credit organizations. This enables 
them to double dip and to smoothen the timing of the repayment. Thus, the 
availability of funds from other micro-credit organizations raises questions 
about whether micro-credit reduces the vulnerability of the poor. It is 
suffice to say that the availability of micro-credit widens the borrowing 
possibilities of the poor. In the absence of positive returns from micro-
enterprises (as in the case of many non-agricultural activities), it could 
lead to more indebtedness among borrowers. Households were also found 
to borrow outside the micro-credit set up from informal sector (like 
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moneylenders, local chit funds, etc.). Thus, the repayment record per se 
does not reveal the true picture of micro-enterprises. 
In the Kudumbashree program, the availability of subsidy acts as 
the incentive mechanism for repayment. Since the subsidy is back-loaded, 
it is an incentive for households to ensure prompt repayment and in many 
cases pre-repay. The empirical analysis on the determinants of repayment 
rate shows that the economic sector variable is the most significant 
variable. 
In sum, repayment of loans under micro-credit programs reveals a 
number of dynamic elements. The most important incentive for good 
repayment record seems to be the availability of subsidy. Cross-financing 
also enables the household to ensure prompt repayment. Among the socio-
economic variables, capital of the project and the sector of operation also 
have a profound influence on repayment. Micro-credit programs like 
Kudumbashree should not be solely judged in terms of repayment records, 
it should also be judged in terms of its social impacts which are discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND MICROFINANCE 
In this chapter, we examine the social capital impact on the 
repayment rate under the Kudumbashree micro-enterprise program. There 
is a growing literature on social capital and scholars from many traditional 
disciplines including history, sociology, psychology, education, political 
science, anthropology, geography, business, management, economics, 
health, urban and environmental studies are now contributing to it. It is 
currently one of the 'inter-disciplinary' topics leading to a cross-
fertilization of ideas. Under group lending, the fate of borrowers is linked 
to the repayment behavior of other group members. Hence, borrowers 
should select creditworthy peers and should be able to monitor each other 
use of funds and enforce repayment. In the presence of altruism and social 
interactions among group members (which not only facilitates peer 
monitoring but also leads to the creation of social capital), group lending 
is expected to deliver better social and economic outcomes (like higher 
repayment rates). 
Kudumbashree being a women-centered micro-credit/finance 
program, the program's impact on women's empowerment as well as its 
economic and social benefits remains an area of much interest. This 
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chapter examines the social capital impacts of the Kudumbashree program 
in Kerala. This chapter is organized as follow: Section 6.1 provides the 
conceptual framework for the analysis and its relevance in microfinance 
programs. Based on this framework, we examine in section 6.2 the fact 
that the Kudumbashree program finances income supplementing activities. 
In section 6.3 we examine the indicators of social capital and its 
relationship with the repayment behavior of the members of the 
Kudumbashree program. Section 6.4 examines the contribution of the 
Kudumbashree program in the social capital formation in Kerala and 
Section 6.5 summarizes the conclusions from this chapter. 
Section 6.1: Conceptual Framework and Review of Literature 
The earlier debate in microfinance literature was in terms of how 
group-based lending programs ensure access to finance for the poor. 
Lately, the debate has been reformulated in terms of social capital. The 
social capital version of the debate looks at how the existence of social 
capital in the form local networks and norms of association acts as a 
substitute for financial collateral in the dispensation of credit to the poor. 
Social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable 
collective actions. There are increasing evidences showing that social 
capital is critical for poverty alleviation and sustainable human and 
economic development. The importance of social capital came into 
prominence following the pioneering work of Putnam, Leonardi and 
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Nanetti in Making Democracy Work (1993) in which the concept was used 
to explain how dense associational networks within civil societies 
correlate positively with indicators of political democracy and economic 
growth. There are wide ranges of frameworks available for studying social 
•11 
capital . Irrespective of these diverse frameworks, there is a general 
consensus among scholars that social capital is both a raw material and a 
goal of development. It is a public good that needs to be created and 
preserved. 
Putnam defines social capital as networks. Grootaert and Bastelaer 
(2002) went further into this direction and formally defined social capital 
as "institutions, relationships, attitudes and values that govern 
interactions among people and contribute to economic and social 
development -" (p 2). However, Bowles and Gintis (2002) argue that the 
expression of social capital should be replaced by the concept of 
community, which focuses on 'what groups do' rather than 'what people 
own'. Some theorists conceive social capital as networks of horizontal and 
vertical linkages. Horizontal linkages are generally those positive social 
networks that contribute to the overall productivity of the community 
(such as volunteer organization). Coleman (1989) added to the literature 
the notion of vertical linkages characterized by hierarchical relationships. 
The unequal power distribution among members (in hierarchical relations) 
31
 Within social capital theory literature there are diverse frameworks: it varies from the 
Marxian analysis (advocated by Ben Fine, 2001) to social capital literature (of Pierre 
Bourdieu, 1986), sociologist perspective (of James Coleman, 1989), neo-classical 
perspective (of Gary Becker, 1991) etc. 
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allowed social capital to produce positive as well as negative outcomes 
(like nepotism, political favoritism etc). Thus, in the literature an 
important distinction is made about 'positive' and 'negative' social capital. 
Some of the most common definitions include viewing social 
capital as 'trust' within and across social organizations and institutions. 
Building a good 'reputation' in business is thus an investment in social 
capital that pays dividends by reducing transaction costs for others 
(Fafchamps and Minten 2002). On another level, social capital is viewed 
as the willingness and capacity to cooperate and engage in collective 
actions for mutual benefits and for reducing free riding problems. At a 
minimum, this requires norms (including sanctions), rules and procedures 
for organizations and networks, which is then the embodied social capital. 
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) define social capital as networks and 
norms (including sanctions) that facilitate collective actions. Implicit in 
this definition is trust and social interactions that make norms and 
networks work for a positive cause33. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) draw 
on sociological literature to conceptualize social capital in terms of 
bonding (between close family members, friends and neighbors) and 
bridging (between more distant associates and colleagues). These 
represent horizontal associations in contrast to vertical linkages to people 
• Narayan (2002: 58) also defines it to include the interaction of formal and informal 
organizations. 
33
 Collective action can be put to negative uses and examples in literature of perverse 
social capital include drug cartels, the mafia, the Ku Klux Klan and even Al Qaeda. Refer 
to Rubio (1997) and Streeten (2002). 
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with influence or in positions of power. Thus, in this conceptualization, 
social capital can be bonding, bridging, or linking. 
Krishna and Uphoff (2002) make a distinction between structural 
and cognitive forms of social capital. Structural forms of social capital are 
associational and facilitate mutually beneficial collective actions. 
Cognitive social capital includes shared norms, values, attitudes and 
beliefs that predispose people towards mutually beneficial collective 
action. Structural social capital is external and more visible and pertains to 
rules, procedures, precedents, networks and organizations whereas 
cognitive social capital is internal and pertains to how people think. 
Cognitive social capital includes individuals towards collective action and 
structural social capital facilitates this. They also make a distinction 
between mutually reinforcing primary mechanisms of social capital like 
trust, solidarity, cooperation, generosity, honesty and secondary forms like 
honesty, egalitarianism, fairness and participation.34 In recent times, given 
the plethora of concepts and wide range of methodological frameworks, 
the World Bank has categorized social capital into six categories: (i) 
groups and networks, (ii) trust, adherence norms and solidarity, (iii) 
collective action and cooperation, (iv) information and communication, (v) 
social cohesion and inclusion and (vi) empowerment and political action 
(see, Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2002). 
34
 Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2002) refer to information and collective action as the 
channels via which social capital has a positive impact on development. 
35
 Some social theorists even argued in favor of 'the political environment' that shapes 
social structures and norms. This introduced a distinction between 'government' social 
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At the empirical level, the question is related to addressing the 
question of how microfmance programs use existing networks to lower 
information and other transaction costs. The 'financial self-sustainability 
paradigm' promoted by the World Bank and the Micro-Credit Summit is 
based on the argument that with social connections, individuals are able to 
screen each other better than any other lending agency in the formal 
system and therefore ensure better savings and repayment rates (on loans). 
It has also been pointed out that group lending techniques create social 
capital through networks and empower the poor (especially women), 
which in turn enable them to undertake collective economic/social and 
political activities. The process of creation of social capital and its 
contribution to the empowerment process (especially women), collective 
action and its interface with the social and political system is equally 
important but relatively neglected in empirical investigations36. 
There is also an influential body of econometric work linking 
indicators of social capital - membership of groups, networks and 
associations, trust on outcome variables like income, access to credit and 
services, project effectiveness, absence of violence, crime etc. (Grootaert 
and Van Bastelaer, 2002). At the multilateral institutions level, the World 
Bank has pioneered a number of efforts to develop instruments to measure 
and quantify social capital using larger household surveys such as 
capital and civil social capital (referring to interactions not associated with government 
rules and systems). 
36
 There are few studies which addresses these issues abroad, See Mayoux (2001) Rankin 
(2002). 
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national-level Living Standards Measurement Survey (Grootaert and Van 
Bastelaer, 2002). The proposed study draws on this methodological 
framework. 
Section 6.2: Microfinance Program as an Income Supplementing Activity 
At the onset, it must be mentioned that the micro-enterprise 
program of Kudumbashree basically aims to augment the income earning 
capacity of poor women households. The primary source of income of 
most of the poor households in our sample was daily wages (66.8 percent). 
The lack of availability of adequate work was one of the reasons for their 
poor economic conditions. At the time of survey, the maximum number of 
days a wage earner could get work was 5 days in a month. 
Table 6.1: Sources of Income for NHGs 
SI Activity Principle source of Activity of NHG 
No. income of NHG households (in %) 
households (in %) 
1 Daily wages 70.0 0.0 
2 Self-employment 
Agriculture 0.0 66.7 
Industry 20.0 23.3 
Service 10.0 10.0 
3(1+2) Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Sample Survey 
The micro-enterprise program of Kudumbashree is supposed to 
augment the income earning capacity of poor households. As it is evident 
from Table 6.1, 70 percent of households under NHG are dependent on 
daily wages for their livelihood. For NHGs, the Kudumbashree micro-
enterprise program is an income augmenting activity; micro-enterprise 
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programs under Kudumbashree basically facilitate self-employment: 67 
percent in agriculture, 23 percent in industry and 10 percent in service 
sector. 
Section 6.3: Indicators of Horizontal Social Capital in the Kudumbashree 
Program 
In micro-credit programs based on group lending, the horizontal 
attributes of a group include (but not only) (a) group size (b) nature of 
activity, (c) the age of the group and stability in its membership (d) 
geographical proximity of members, (e) social collateral and (f) group 
solidarity etc. In the following paragraphs, we examine the Kudumbashree 
microfinance program in terms of each of the following attributes. 
(a) Group Size and Repayment Rate 
One of the interesting questions in micro-credit programs is the 
optimum size of the borrowing groups. The size of the group determines 
the incentives for free-riding37. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) argue that 
despite the probability of the insurance effect among group members, 
smaller groups are preferred as they have better in-group co-ordination 
and reduce the level of free rider problem. Bangladesh's Grameen Bank 
prefers smaller groups of usually five members to keep in-group co-
ordination problems under control. On the other hand, Buckley (1996) 
37
 Free-riding incentives refer to the possibility of some members of the group defaulting 
and fellow borrowers repaying the loan of the defaulter(s). 
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empirically finds that groups with 10 or more members can still work 
effectively. 
Under Kudumbashree program, an NHG could have 1 0 - 2 0 
members, which is greater than the average size of Bangladesh's Grameen 
the Bank. This raises question about the cohesiveness of NHGs under 
Kudumbashree program. The average size of NHGs was found to be 12 
members. If one examines the difference in group membership at the time 
of formation and at the time of survey, there was only a marginal decline 
(of one member). This indicates that NHGs as a group were relatively 
stable under the Kudumbashree program. The correlation between the size 
of NHG and the repayment rate is relatively weak. Although there is a 
general inverse relationship between group size and repayment rate: 
higher the group size, lower the repayment rate, this relationship is not 
very strong (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: Repayment Rate According to the Number of Members in 
the NHG 
Group size (no) Repayment rate (in %) 
9 to 11 92.1 
12 to 14 99.2 
More than 14 (up to 20) 88.8 
Source: Sample Survey 
(b) Nature of Activity of NHGs: Individual Vs Group Activity 
Although the bank loan is given to the group, activities could be 
individual or group based. Under group based micro-enterprise activities, 
the group loans is invested in a common asset in which each individual or 
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family contributes in their respective labor (e.g. running a food processing 
plant, grocery store, etc.) On the other hand, most of the agricultural 
operations (like goat, cow and rabbit rearing) are individual family based. 
Group loan is distributed to each family which is then invested in different 
individual activities. The profits/loses are then individually appropriated. 
Table 6.3: Repayment Rate According to the Nature of the Activity 
Nature of Activity 
Individual activity 
Group activity 
Repayment rate (in %) 
99.6 
88.2 
Number 
21 
9 
NHGs 
% to total 
70 
30 
Source: Sample Survey 
It is important to note that activities sponsored by Kudumbashree 
are mostly individual activities. Households seem to prefer individual 
activity instead of group activity. Members join together as NHGs to take 
advantage of the loan (and especially the explicit subsidy attached to the 
loan), but they prefer to practice their income-generating activities 
individually. The repayment rate of the individual activities was also 
higher than the one practiced in groups (see Table 6.3). 
(c) Age of the Group and Stability of its Membership. 
The age of existence of NHGs is a characteristic that can influence 
the repayment rate. NHGs with long period of existence could have a 
better homogeneity and solidarity in their group, which can explain why 
their repayment rate was better. In this study, groups with longer existence 
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were found to have better repayment rate (Table 6.4). The average age of 
the NHGs under Kudumbashree was of 3 years at the time of the survey. 
The oldest groups (four and five years of existence) accounted for 33 
percent of NHGs. Groups with less than one year of existence had a 
comparatively lower repayment record (90 percent). 
Table 6.4: Repayment Rate According to NHGs' Years of Existence 
Years of 
Existence 
4-5 
2-3 
1 and less 
Repayment rate 
(in %) 
96.0 
94.7 
90.0 
Number 
10 
16 
4 
NHGs 
% to total 
33.3 
53.3 
13.3 
Source: Survey 
In the case of the Kudumbashree program, Kudumbashree acts as 
an NGO facilitating mobilization of the poor. In terms of the survey data, 
the average year of incorporation for most of NHGs under Kudumbashree 
program was 2003; 2003 was their year of incorporation, but several 
groups existed prior to this date. In most cases, the poor had been 
mobilized and started thrift under a private NGO (then, they were SHGs). 
When the Kudumbashree program was announced, these SHGs converted 
themselves into NHGs, the main driving force for this change being the 
institutional set up of the Kudumbashree program. Being a government 
entity, it creates a number of additional benefits like subsidy, training and 
a capacity to network with political representatives, which are all facilities 
that are attractive to the poor. 
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(d) Geographical Proximity of its members: 
Most of the members of the Kudumbashree micro-enterprise 
program are from the same locality (panchayat). This considerably 
enhances the ability of the members to monitor its peers and reduce 
information asymmetry widely talked about in the credit rationing 
literature. 
(e) Social Collateral 
One of the attributes of group lending is that group members are 
able to use peer pressure to encourage repayment. In the Besley and Coate 
(1995) repayment game, peer pressure, referred to as social collateral that 
would make an individual repay the loan that would have otherwise 
defaulted. Besley and Coate (1995) argue that the group lending reduces 
the free rider problem, enhances co-ordination among members, promotes 
'social ties' and enhances peer pressure and group solidarity. This process 
creates social capital which promotes trust and facilitates lending. 
In the Kudumbashree program, peer pressure is facilitated by the 
choice of group members. Group members self-select themselves and 
normally belong to a particular neighborhood. This facilitates social ties 
among group members and considerably adds to in-group coordination 
such as conducting weekly meeting, group monitoring and other social 
interaction. 
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Kudumbashree requires that its members meet once a week. These 
meetings are extremely important for the development of the group and 
social ties within the group. Group meetings are a formal forum for group 
interaction, peer monitoring and peer mentoring. Group members share 
their personal and professional experiences relating to the conduct of 
micro-enterprises. This becomes a 'knowledge pool' which is a common 
resource of the group. The knowledge pool could be enhanced through the 
training programs arranged by Kudumbashree which in turn are shared 
among other group members. These social interactions broaden the 
horizon of the members, not only on micro-enterprises but also on non-
financial components like healthcare, sanitary, education and other social-
economic issues. Moreover, these meetings enable women to have a role 
outside their family by offering them the capacity to reconcile work with 
family life. It also increases their bargaining power within the family and 
empowers them to participate in social and civil life. 
Another effect of the weekly meetings is that they act as a formal 
mechanism to document their group and social interactions. Group 
members formally interact with each other through these meetings. The 
agenda for each meeting includes discussions on thrift, amount of loan, 
norms for loan disbursal, etc., that are recorded. These documents act as 
evidences of their in-group solidarity and mutual insurance for lenders 
(banks). 
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Group meetings provide an opportunity to assess the repayment of 
its members. Individual defaults are easily identified and discussed 
collectively. One can identify two types of peer pressure working on 
individual defaulters - ex-ante and ex-post peer pressure. The ex-ante peer 
pressure reinforces an individual's desire to repay her portion of the loan. 
Normally defaulting members are given a grace period and are encouraged 
to find alternative sources of funds. If the individual is not in a position to 
repay, the group can then exert ex-post pressure. The ex-post pressure can 
take a number of forms including village gossip, seizure of assets, etc. 
(f) Group Solidarity 
Group solidarity is defined as the willingness of the credit group to 
occasionally pay for one of its members. Normally, in the Kudumbashree 
program group members offer to help a member in need of assistance. The 
assistance is normally in the form of advises and in extreme case with 
small bridge loans. If defaults persist, the member is normally removed 
from the group by applying ex-post pressure discussed above. Normally, 
in such eventuality, the existing members will bear that liability equitably. 
The incentive to redeem the debt of another member is driven by the fact 
that if a member default, then the entire group is considered as a default 
group which puts them at a disadvantage in renewing the loan (the 
contingent renewal explanation discussed in chapter V). Moreover, the 
ones who are eligible for the explicit subsidy would lose this privilege. 
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Section 6.4: The Contribution of the Kudumbashree Program in the 
Formation of Social Capital in Kerala 
Box 6.1: Concrete Example of the Creation of Social Capital 
Ms. Fatima Xavier (name changed to protect identity) is one of the office 
bearers of the CDS in Kumily, Thekkady. Her house is located in a mountain 
isolated from the village. To reach the nearby public road, she has to walk 
about four kilometers through mountainous path. She is the sole bread winner 
in her family with a husband and two daughters. She does not have a regular 
job. She can sometimes do daily agricultural jobs to earn a daily income which 
is around Rs. 50. Such jobs are hardly available - normally she works less than 
5 days in a month. Her husband cannot bring an income for his family because 
he has a brain tumor which keeps him out of work and he is on the death bed. 
She is surviving because of the small land the family owns which she 
cultivates to generates vegetables and other cereal substitutes (like tapioca). 
Because of her situation, she had to give her two daughters to Christian 
adoption because she could not feed them properly. What comforts her is that 
in the Christian orphanage, her daughters will be able to receive an education 
and benefit from a good supplying of food. 
She decided to join the Kudumbashree program and now she is 
volunteering in this organization as one of the leaders of the CDS. Then, her 
needs and the one of her surroundings could be heard because her voice gained 
importance within her community. She said that this organization gave her the 
opportunity to stay connected with the surrounding population. She recited to 
us how she and her husband were able to survive because of the support they 
received from NHGs members. Moreover, by being better integrated in her 
community, she received dividend due to her increasing social capital (both 
horizontally and vertically). As an example, one day, she had to stay at the 
hospital (away from the village) for a long period of time to be with her sick 
husband. On her way back, she had no food or money to buy some. When she 
came back to her house, her friends from Kudumbashree left a bag of rice for 
her so she can sustain herself for a while. In this occasion, her increasing social 
capital was able to compensate for what her low income could not give to her. 
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Vertical Social Capital 
Vertical social capital is characterized by hierarchical relationships 
and an unequal power distribution among members38. The nature of the 
vertical relationship of the group (NHG) with other political structures 
determines the extent of its interaction with the civil society. 
Kudumbashree being a state-sponsored microfinance entity, it has certain 
advantages over other (private) MFIs. It gets funding (in the form of 
subsidies) from both local and state governments. It also provides training 
to its members in terms of technical and business knowledge. It also gives 
better means for the poor to be heard in the higher structures of the civil 
society. 
With its structure, Kudumbashree organization is vertically linked 
with local self-government and local planning. Politically, the structure of 
Kudumbashree is a bottom-up approach, where poor women household 
join together to ameliorate their poor economic conditions. However, it is 
this group which elects and supports its upper structure -ADS and CDS. 
The CDS unit is organically linked with the local government (called 
Local Gram Sabha) which is constituted of elected representatives from 
the local community. The CDS is also linked with the state government 
through the Kudumbashree program. 
In 1996, the Left Democratic Front (LDF) coalition government 
launched a statewide People's Campaign for Decentralized Planning, also 
called: the Peoples Plan Campaign. In 1997, the State devolved 35-40 
38
 See Anderson and Locker (2002) p.99. 
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percent of the state's annual outlay to local governments (Local Gram 
Sabha). The objective of the campaign was to create a new participatory 
model of local-level governance. In this process NHGs were seen as a 
potentially powerful mechanism for ensuring sustained participation in 
local plan formulation and implementation - NHG members were 
supposed to actively participate in Local Gram Sabhas (LGSs) (see Chart 
6.1). This created considerable friction between NHGs and LGS. LGS saw 
it as means by state government to bypass them. CDS gets funds from 
LGS, state government and banks. After years of negotiation, now a 
consensus has emerged: the CDS systems are sub-systems of LGSs but not 
subordinate to them. 
It is to be noted that the existence of Kudumbashree program 
provides to women a wider avenue to participate in social and political 
life. It enables them to have a role outside the family and empowers them 
to seek participation in social and civil life. In fact, a large number of 
members of NHGs participated in the local political process (elections 
which happens every five years) and many of them got elected to LGS. 
This women empowerment process could be possible only because of the 
Kudumbashree microfinance program. 
Needless to say, the organic link between CDS and LGS provides 
an avenue for friction. The change in the political leadership at LGS leads 
to frictions between the CDS and LGS and such frictions affect negatively 
the livelihood of the poor. Many private NGOs feel that Kudumbashree 
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poses an unfair competition to them. They feel that the government has the 
power to take control and restrict the growth of civil society. 
Chart 6.1; Structure of Kudumbashree's Vertical Interaction 
State Government 
Panchayat 
Politicians (LGS) 
Section 6.5 Conclusion 
Kudumbashree as a micro-credit program generates a high 
repayment rate. The peer-monitoring argument provides the theoretical 
reasoning why group members monitor each other. The formation of the 
group, the process of social capital creation and its impact on the society is 
a fascinating area of research. 
Financially, the bank linkage structure of the Kudumbashree 
program helps the poor to get an access to commercial banks, an access 
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that they could not have otherwise. By being a part of one NHG, they have 
a chance to develop their own credit history with one bank and develop 
banking relationships in the future. 
The formation of the group and its mandated weekly group 
meetings provide an avenue for members of the group to interact socially 
and monitor each other (peer monitoring and peer mentoring). Given the 
fact that the members of the group are from a common geographical area, 
this provides an additional avenue to monitor each other beyond the 
formal group meetings. These social interactions provide to the members a 
strong network in the community and create a common knowledge pool, 
especially in the sphere of running micro-enterprises. Moreover, the group 
formation provides a social safety net to address their financial challenges 
as well as other family and social issues. These interactions create 
considerable positive externalities in the community. 
The group (NHG) has also got considerable vertical relationship 
with local and state governments. These relationships enable group 
members to participate in the social and civil society. Nevertheless, there 
are frictions between the CDS and LGS as often LGS view CDS as the 
mechanism of the state government to by-pass the local authority. With 
long periods of negotiations it is now recognized that CDS systems are 
sub-systems of LGSs but not subordinate to them. Nevertheless, the 
change in the political leadership at LGS level often creates frictions 
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between CDS and LGS and this is not helpful for the functioning of an 
anti-poverty program like Kudumbashree. 
Political parties are aware of the vast potential of the NHGs to 
mobilize people. Our field visits show that political parties tried to push 
their agenda through the NHGs. Despite the fact that this is a great source 
of information for NHGs members, this often creates disharmony and 
discord in the Kudumbashree program. Given these minor shortcomings, 
the micro-credit program of Kudumbashree has shown visible return 
especially from the standpoint of empowerment of women and their ability 
to cope up with vulnerabilities and participate as equal in the social and 
civil society. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
Kerala, the tiny state in the southwest corner of India began to 
attract the attention of policy makers from all over the world due to its 
development experience called the 'Kerala model of economic 
development'. Kerala's attainment of social development (which can be 
compare to Scandinavian countries) with a low standard of living is often 
touted as a model of development for the Third World. But the 
sustainability of this model has been threatened in recent years by the 
large-scale unemployment and worsening agrarian and credit situation in 
the state. These developments have also put poverty in the focus of public 
policy debates. 
It was in this background that in Kerala, the women-centered 
Kudumbashree program was initiated in 1998. The Kudumbashree program 
was initiated by the state (provincial) government and embraces a number 
of elements: micro-enterprises, insurance, education, old-age assistance, 
etc. The Kudumbashree microfinance program is unique in the sense that it 
is the first microfinance program initiated by a provincial (state) 
government with the purpose of poverty eradication. It has put its spotlight 
on women and poverty. Second, the method used to identify the poor is 
also unique and reflects the multidimensional aspects of poverty. Thirdly, 
the dynamic incentive provided by Kudumbashree in the form of a back-
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loaded subsidy element is supposed to spur repayment and it is interesting 
to examine the moral hazard issues associated with this. One of the main 
objectives of the Kudumbashree program is the promotion of income 
through the promotion of micro-enterprises. The micro-enterprise program 
of Kudumbashree has generated good repayment rate (around 95 per cent) 
and is often cited as a success story from the people living in Kerala. The 
present study examined the dynamics of this high repayment rate and also 
the social impacts of this program based on a primary survey done in June 
2006 of a sample of micro-enterprises in two communities (panchayats or 
local gram sabha) in Kerala. 
The Indian model of microfinance is essentially based on the SHG-
Bank linkage model as compared with the Grameen Bank model. 
NABARD is the apex institution responsible for overseeing rural credit and 
rural development. It provides refinance to banks that lend money to the 
SHGs. The SHG-Bank linkage approach is found to be an effective 
instrument by which poor people (or the informal sector) can access credit 
from the formal sector without collateral security and simultaneously 
improve their thrift habits. It has also helped banks to improve their 
profitability as the repayment rates under this type of lending are fairly 
high and transactions costs relatively low since the bulk of the 
intermediation work is done by the NHGs. Apart from the NABARD 
patronized SHG-Bank linkage model, there exists a parallel system of 
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microfinance institutions promoted by non-state (private) agencies. 
However, their outreach is not very significant. 
An analysis of the proximate determinants of the repayment rate 
among households in the Kudumbashree program in Kerala found that the 
repayment rate is inversely related to capital size. Micro-enterprises do 
create considerable non-tradables especially in non-agricultural areas 
(output which cannot be sold due to lack of marketing expertise or due to 
lack of demand in rural areas or both). This would have implications for 
the repayment rate. Micro-enterprises which are agriculture-based have 
high repayment record as opposed to non-agricultural micro-enterprises. 
Non-agricultural micro-enterprises have substantial marketing problems 
which lead to low repayment of loans. It was also found that households 
with land ownership have higher repayment record. The conduct of most 
of the agricultural activities involved land ownership. Lack of land 
ownership could act as a constraint on the conduct of micro-enterprises. 
Although the extent of land ownership is very small (less than 10 cents of 
land), it provides an endowment to conduct micro-enterprises. 
Most of the households (around 50 percent) were found to have 
multiple memberships in other micro-credit organizations. This enables 
them to double dip and to smoothen the timing of the repayment. Thus, the 
availability of funds from other micro-credit organizations raises questions 
about whether micro-credit reduces the vulnerability of the poor. It is 
suffice to say that the availability of micro-credit widens the borrowing 
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possibilities of the poor. In the absence of positive returns from micro-
enterprises (as in the case of many non-agricultural activities), it could 
lead to more indebtedness among borrowers. Households were also found 
to borrow from the microfinance set up, that is from the informal sector 
(like moneylenders, local chit funds, etc.). Thus, the repayment record per 
se does not reveal the true picture of micro-enterprises. 
In the Kudumbashree program, the availability of subsidy acts as 
the dynamic incentive mechanism for repayment. Since the subsidy is 
back-loaded, it is an incentive for households to ensure prompt repayment 
and in many cases, pre-repay. 
Financially, the bank linkage structure of the Kudumbashree 
program helps the poor to get an access to commercial banks, an access 
that they could not have otherwise had. By being a part of a NHG, they 
have a chance to develop their own credit history with one banking 
institution and develop banking relationships for the future. 
The formation of the group and its mandated weekly group 
meetings provide an avenue for group members to interact socially and to 
monitor each other (peer monitoring). The fact that group members are 
from a common geographical area provides them with an additional 
avenue to monitor each other that goes beyond the formal group meetings. 
These social interactions establish the foundation of a strong network in 
the community and create a knowledge pool, especially in the sphere of 
running micro-enterprises. Moreover, the formation of the group provides 
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a social safety net to address not only their financial challenges, but also 
other family and social issues. These interactions create considerable 
positive externalities in the community. 
The group (NHG) also has considerable vertical relationships with 
local and state governments. These relationships provide group members 
to participate in social and civil activities. Nevertheless, there are frictions 
between the CDS and LGS as the LGS often view the CDS as a 
mechanism of the state government to by-pass local authority. With long 
periods of negotiations it is now recognized that the CDS systems are sub-
systems of the LGSs, but not subordinate to them. Nevertheless, the 
change in the political leadership at the LGS level, often creates frictions 
between the CDS and LGS and this is not helpful for the functioning of an 
anti-poverty program like Kudumbashree. 
Political parties are aware of the vast potential of the NHGs to 
mobilize people. Our field visits show that political parties tried to push 
their agenda through the NHGs. This often creates disharmony and 
discord in the Kudumbashree program. Given these minor shortcomings, 
the micro-credit program of Kudumbashree has shown visible return 
especially from the standpoint of empowerment of women and their ability 
to cope up with vulnerabilities and participate as equals in the social and 
civil activities. 
The above-mentioned analysis raises a number of questions. One 
of the most significant questions is the role of the micro-credit program in 
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poverty alleviation. Is it the silver bullet as it is often discussed? It must be 
recognized that the micro-credit/finance program has its own limitations. 
It does not always cover the poorest of the poor. To be a member of a 
group requires that the poor have some thrift, which is not always the case. 
Secondly, the poorest of the poor are not always accepted in a group as 
they are seen as a bad credit risk. 
The second most important challenge of the Kudumbashree micro-
enterprise program is the lack of demand for its goods and services (non-
tradable). Non-tradables are the result of either lack of marketing know-
how or lack of demand for these goods in rural areas. Although there are a 
number of choices in this regard, the development of agriculture is perhaps 
the best and most sustainable solution. Furthermore, if these groups are 
properly networked, they could act a good supply chain and marketing 
outlet for many of the goods produced by these entities (similar to the fair 
trade movement). Above all, as discussed above, the most significant 
achievement of this unique micro-credit program is the creation of social 
capital which helps the poor (if not the poorest of the poor) to confront 
livelihood challenges. 
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Appendix 1: Quality of Life Indicators, Poverty and State Income 
Birth Rate (per 1 000) 
(1995) 
Death Rate (per 1 000) 
(1995) 
Infant Mortality Rate (per 
1000) (1996) 
Life Expectancy (1989-93) 
Literacy Rate (%) (1991) 
Male 
Female 
Poverty Rate (%) (1973-74) 
Rural 
Urban 
Poverty Rate (%)(1999-
2000) (d) 
Rural 
Urban 
Net State Domestic Product 
(e) 
1970 
1980 
2000 
2005 
Kerala 
18.0 
6.0 
13.0 
72.0 
93.6 
86.2 
59.2 
62.7 
9.4 
20.3 
1325 
1 508 
10714 
13 321 
India 
28.3 
9.0 
72.0 
59.4 
64.1 
39.3 
55.7 
48.0 
26.8 
24.1 
1 387 (f) 
1 579 (f) 
10 308(f) 
12 416(/) 
Low-
Income 
Countries 
39.8 
9.0 
69.0 (b) 
63.0 (b) 
46.0 
35.0 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
United 
States 
22.8 (a) 
5.9 (a) 
6.0 (b) 
77.0 (c) 
>95.0 
>95.0 
-
-
-
-
-
22 677 
US$ 
34 774 
US$ 
37 255 
US$ 
Sources: Government of India (1998), Government of Kerala (1996), World Bank (1997, 
2001), United Nations (1997), Reserve Bank of India (2006), International Monetary 
Fund (2007); Government of India, National Accounts Statistics. Poverty rates 
(headcount indices) from NSSO (various years). 
Notes: (a) Refers to 1994 
(b) Refers to 1997 
(c) Refers to 1999 
(d) The 1999-2000 poverty estimates refer to the 30-day recall period. 
(e) Refers to per capital state domestic product at factor cost at 1980-01 constant 
prices 
in rupees for the years 1970 and 1980, and at factor cost at 1993-94 (constant 
prices) for the years 2000 and 2005. 
(f) Refers to average for 14 major Indian states: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, 
Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. 
1 US$ equals 44.49 Indian Rupees (May 2007) 
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Appendix 2.1: Interstate Comparison of Key Socio-Economic 
Indicators in India (1) 
State Per SR CBR CDR Life Expectancy at birth 
capita 2001 (per (per 1993-97 
NSDP 000s) 000s) M F Tot 
Kerala 
All-India 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Karnataka 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
2004-05 
13 321 
12416 
12 352 
6 721 
4 034 
16 780* 
16 872 
13 141* 
8 199 
16 479* 
6 555 
16 756 
9 603 
13 999 
6 138 
11612* 
1058 
933 
978 
932 
921 
921 
861 
964 
920 
922 
972 
874 
922 
986 
898 
934 
1999 
18.0 
26.1 
21.7 
27.0 
31.5 
25.4 
26.8 
22.3 
31.1 
21.1 
24.1 
21.5 
31.1 
19.3 
32.8 
20.7 
1999 
6.4 
8.7 
8.2 
9.7 
8.9 
7.9 
7.7 
7.7 
10.4 
7.5 
10.7 
7.4 
8.4 
8.0 
10.5 
7.1 
70.4 
60.4 
61.2 
56.6 
60.4 
60.9 
63.7 
61.6 
55.6 
64.1 
57.1 
66.7 
59.1 
63.2 
58.1 
62.2 
75.9 
61.8 
63.5 
57.1 
58.4 
62.9 
64.6 
64.9 
55.2 
66.6 
57.0 
68.8 
60.1 
65.1 
56.9 
63.6 
73.3 
61.1 
62.4 
56.7 
59.6 
61.9 
64.1 
63.3 
55.5 
65.5 
57.2 
67.7 
60.0 
64.1 
57.6 
62.8 
Notes: NSDP means Net State Domestic Product (at constant price, Base: 1993-94, in 
Rupees); * refers to NSDP of 2003-04. CBR means Crude Birth Rate. CDR means Crude 
Death Rate. 
Sources: Provisional Population Totals (Census of India 2001); SRS Bulletin; National 
Family Health Survey-2, 1998-99; Economic Survey 2001-2002; Human development 
Report - Maharashtra 2002 and; Reserve Bank of India. 
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Appendix 2.2: Interstate Comparison of Key Social Indicators in 
India (2) 
State Density of Adult Total Mean age at marriage 
population literacy fertility 1998-99 
(per Km2) rate in rate 1997- Male Female 
2001 % 98 
(1991) 
Kerala 
All-India 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Karnataka 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
819 
324 
275 
340 
880 
258 
477 
275 
196 
314 
236 
482 
165 
478 
689 
904 
88 
48.5 
38.5 
49.6 
24.8 
55.9 
48.9 
-
40.0 
60.4 
46.1 
52.9 
35.5 
57.0 
38.6 
56.2 
1.8 
3.2 
2.4 
3.2 
4.3 
3.0 
3.3 
2.4 
3.9 
2.7 
2.9 
2.6 
4.1 
2.0 
4.6 
2.4 
27.9 
24.9 
23.9 
27.8 
23.8 
24.4 
24.6 
26.7 
23.5 
25.3 
26.6 
25.7 
22.3 
26.6 
23.3 
26.2 
21.5 
19.7 
18.3 
21.7 
18.8 
20.2 
19.8 
20.1 
18.9 
19.8 
21.2 
22.1 
18.3 
20.9 
19.0 
19.6 
Notes: * Figures are provisional 
Sources: Provisional Population Totals (Census of India 2001); SRS Bulletin; 
National Family Health Survey-2, 1998-99; Economic Survey 2001-2002; and 
Human development Report - Maharashtra 2002. 
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Appendix 2.3: Interstate Comparison of Key Social Indicators in 
India (3) 
State Maternal 
mortality rate 
(per 100 000 
live births) 
1998 
Kerala 
All-India 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Karnataka 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
198 
407 
159 
409 
452 
28 
103 
195 
498 
135 
367 
199 
670 
79 
707 
266 
11 
45 
46 
51 
44 
44 
41 
42 
61 
29 
60 
33 
50 
35 
52 
30 
3.6 
22.5 
18.1 
27.5 
22.9 
19.6 
22.4 
16.7 
32.6 
12.7 
29.0 
16.8 
27.7 
13.0 
29.6 
15.0 
14 
70 
66 
76 
63 
63 
68 
58 
90 
48 
97 
53 
81 
52 
84 
52 
Sources: Provisional Population Totals (Census of India 2001); SRS Bulletin; National 
Family Health Survey-2, 1998-99; Economic Survey 2001-2002; and Human 
development Report - Maharashtra 2002. 
Neo- Child Infant mortality 
Natal mortality rate (per 1 000 
mortality rate 1999 live births) 1999 
rate 1999 
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Appendix 3: District-Wise Performance of Kudumbashree Units 
(2005-2006) 
Velocity of 
Amount of Amount of Internal 
SI. No Districts Thrift Loan lending 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Trivandrum 
Kollam 
Pathanamthitta 
Alappuzha 
Kottayam 
Idukki 
Ernakulam 
Thrissur 
Palakkad 
Malappuram 
Kozhikkode 
Wayanad 
Kannur 
Kasargode 
Total Rural 
(excluding tribal) 
Tribal 
Urban 
(in million Rupees) 
623.3 
439.4 
261.3 
491.0 
334.7 
414.1 
419.6 
642.7 
554.5 
465.1 
613.3 
261.6 
454.7 
256.8 
6,232.2 
54.1 
354.2 
1,055.8 
926.0 
441.9 
1,093.4 
568.6 
1,007.0 
874.4 
2,318.4 
1,143.2 
609.6 
1,572.0 
1,054.2 
1,258.8 
926.5 
14,849.7 
107.6 
394.9 
1.69 
2.11 
1.69 
2.23 
1.70 
2.43 
2.08 
3.61 
2.06 
1.31 
2.56 
4.03 
2.77 
3.61 
2.38 
2.0 
1.11 
B 
Source: Kudumbashree 
